Staff report on auditor independence, March 1994 by United States. Securities and Exchange Commission. Office of the Chief Accountant
University of Mississippi
eGrove
Federal Publications Accounting Archive
1994
Staff report on auditor independence, March 1994
United States. Securities and Exchange Commission. Office of the Chief Accountant
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/acct_fed
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Accounting Archive at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Federal Publications
by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
United States. Securities and Exchange Commission. Office of the Chief Accountant, "Staff report on auditor independence, March
1994" (1994). Federal Publications. 309.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/acct_fed/309
STAFF REPORT ON AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
A Re-examination of the Background and Need for Auditor 
Independence, the Current Rules and interpretations of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, and Other Nations Relating to Auditor 
Independence, and Recent and Proposed Changes in Those Rules and 
Interpretations.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
March 1994
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...............................  1
II. BACKGROUND....................................... 1
III. SEC RULES AND INTERPRETATIONS.................. 35
IV. PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE
OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS.......... 40
V. OTHER NATIONS' INDEPENDENCE REQUIREMENTS......45
VI. RECENT AND CURRENTLY PROPOSED CHANGES......... 50
VII. CONCLUSION....................................... 55
1I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This staff report responds to the March 18, 1993 request from 
Congressman Edward J. Markey, Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
("Commission" or "SEC") study the need for, and any impediments to, 
the independence of public accountants in performing their 
responsibilities under the Federal securities laws. Chairman 
Markey requested that the Commission provide the Subcommittee with 
any recommendations for legislation that the Commission may 
consider appropriate or any conclusions regarding changes in the 
Commission's rules that may be required for the protection of 
investors or in the public interest. Chairman Markey's letter is 
reproduced at Appendix I.
This report, prepared by the staff of the Office of the Chief 
Accountant of the Commission ("OCA"), provides background 
information on the issue of auditor independence (section II), 
discusses the Commission's independence rule and related 
interpretations (section III) and pronouncements of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (section IV) and other 
nations' independence requirements (section V), and, finally, 
discusses recent and certain current proposals regarding 
independence issues (section VI).
The staff of the OCA does not, at this time, recommend (a) 
enactment of additional legislation or (b) promulgation of 
additional rules by the Commission with respect to the independence 
of external auditors to public companies. The Federal securities 
laws require that the financial statements of public companies be 
audited by independent accountants. The Commission has the 
authority under those laws to define the term independent. The 
Commission has adopted a rule to implement the statutory 
requirement and, from time to time, has provided formal 
interpretations of the term. The Commission staff has, from time 
to time, provided both written and oral interpretations of the 
term. The Commission, when necessary, has instituted formal 
complaints against auditors that it has found not to be 
independent. Lastly, the Commission has resorted to the Courts, 
when necessary, to enforce the Commission's interpretations of the 
term. The staff of the OCA believes that no further legislation 




Prior to the enactment of the Federal securities laws, many 
in the accounting profession recognized the need for auditors to 
be independent from their audit clients if their audit reports were
2to add credibility to the financial reporting process. This 
requirement for auditors to be independent was written into the 
Federal securities laws and the Commission, since its inception, 
actively has enforced it. At least 40 enforcement actions, more 
than ten interpretive releases, and various releases in which the 
Commission proposed or adopted disclosure items, such as the 
auditor change disclosures required to be filed on Form 8-K, 
discuss auditor independence issues. Also, as noted elsewhere in 
this report, the Commission staff responds to requests for oral 
advice on auditor independence issues almost daily, and maintains 
a public file of responses to written requests for such advice. 
The. Need for Auditor Independence
The independence of accountants who audit the financial 
statements included in filings with the Commission is crucial to 
the credibility of financial reporting and, in turn, the capital 
formation process. The public confidence in the reliability of 
issuers' financial statements that is provided by the performance 
of independent audits encourages investment in securities issued 
by public companies. This sense of confidence depends on 
reasonable investors perceiving auditors as independent 
professionals who have neither mutual nor conflicting interests 
with their audit clients and who exercise objective and impartial 
judgment on all issues brought to their attention.
The Federal securities laws recognize the importance of 
independent audits by requiring, or permitting the Commission to 
require, that financial statements filed with the Commission by 
public companies, investment companies, broker/dealers, public 
utilities, investment advisers, and others, be certified (or 
audited) by independent public accountants,1/ and by granting the
1/ For example, items 25 and 26 of Schedule A to the Securities 
Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act"), 15 U.S.C. 77aa(25) and (26), and 
§17(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange 
Act”), 15 U.S.C. 78q, expressly require that financial 
statements be audited by independent public or certified 
accountants. Sections 12(b)(1)(J) and (K) and 13(a)(2) of the 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 781 and 78m, §§5(b)(H) and (I),
10(a)(1)(G), and 14 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act 
of 1935, 15 U.S.C. 79e(b), 79j , and 79n, §§8(b)(5) and 30(e) 
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-8 and 
80a-29, and §203 (c) (1)(D) of the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(c)(1), authorize the Commission to
require the filing of financial statements that have been 
audited by independent accountants. Accordingly, the 
Commission has required that certain financial statements be 
audited by independent accountants. See, e.g., Article 3 of 
Regulation S-X, 17 CFR §210.3-01 et seq.
3Commission the authority to define the term "independent. "2/ 
Currently, more than 13,000 public companies file audited, annual 
financial statements with the Commission under the Exchange Act 
alone. In addition, audited financial statements were used in 1992 
in the United States in connection with the public issuance of $718 
billion of securities, a 46 percent increase from the prior year.3/ 
Given the large volume of filings made with the Commission by 
public companies and other entities, the Commission staff is not 
able to review each financial statement in detail. During 1992, 
however, the Commission's Division of Corporation Finance reviewed 
approximately 3,058 reporting issuers' financial statements and 
related disclosures.4/ These reviews by the staff, barring an 
enforcement inquiry, were limited to documents filed with the 
Commission (or provided supplementally to the staff) and are not 
a substitute for the testing of the account balances and 
transactions and an evaluation of events, conditions, and 
circumstances underlying financial statements that comprise an 
audit. By necessity, the Commission relies heavily on the 
accounting profession 5 / to be primarily responsible for examining
2/ Section 19(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 77s(a), § 3 (b) of the 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78c(b), §20(a) of the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. 79t(a), and §38(a) of 
the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-37(a), grant 
the Commission the authority to define accounting, technical, 
and trade terms used in each Act.
3/ See Testimony of Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman, U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, Before the Subcommittee on Securities 
of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, Concerning the Commission's Authorization Request for 
Fiscal Years 1994-1995, at 2 (July 29, 1993).
4 / U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Fifty-Eighth Annual
Report, at 54-55 (1992).
5/ Due in part to the franchise granted under the Federal 
securities laws to the accounting profession to audit the 
financial statements of public companies, the accounting 
profession has grown and prospered. The six largest firms are 
international service organizations generating $11.6 billion 
in annual U.S. revenues, $31.3 billion in annual worldwide 
revenues, and having approximately 8,350 partners and 71,700 
professional staff in the U.S. Five of the six firms derive 
approximately half of their revenues from accounting and 
auditing services. Public Accounting Report at 1, 3-5 (March 
31, 1993).
4the huge volume of financial data that forms the cornerstone of the 
Commission's full disclosure system.6/
The Independence Concept
Much of the U.S. theory of auditing and independence appears 
to have come from the United Kingdom.7/ U.S. accounting firms 
generally began conducting audits in order to report to foreign 
entities, principally in the United Kingdom, on the status of their 
U.S. investments.
As their auditing practices grew and the demands of U.S. 
investors for financial information increased, accountants in this 
country began to recognize the same importance in obtaining the 
public's confidence (as opposed to the confidence of their clients' 
managements) that had been recognized a generation before in the 
U.K.8 / For example, Charles Reckitt stated in The Public 
Accountant (Philadelphia), in January 1900:
A public accountant acknowledges no master but the public ....
A public accountant's certificate, though addressed to 
president or directors, is virtually made to the public, who
6/ See Touche Ross & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission. 
609 F.2d 570, 580-581 (2d Cir. 1979), which states:
The role of the accounting and legal professions in 
implementing the objectives of the disclosure policy (in 
the Federal securities laws] has increased as the number 
and complexity of securities transactions has increased. 
By the very nature of its operations, the Commission, 
with its small staff and limited resources, cannot 
possibly examine, with the degree of close scrutiny 
required for full disclosure, each of the many financial 
statements which are filed. Recognizing this, the 
Commission must rely heavily on both the accounting and 
legal professions to perform their tasks diligently and 
responsibly. Breaches of professional responsibility 
jeopardize the achievement of the objectives of the 
securities laws and can inflict great damage on public 
investors.
7/ For a general discussion of the historical development of the 
concept of auditor independence, see generally, Previts, The 
Scope of CPA Services (John Wiley & Sons, 1985).
8/ D. Causey, Duties and Liabilities of Public Accountants, at 
30-31 (Dow Jones-Irwin, rev. ed. 1982).
5are actually or prospectively stockholders. He should have 
ability, varied experience and undoubted integrity. 9/
Arthur Lowes Dickinson, a British accountant, who soon after 
his arrival in this country was chosen to head Price Waterhouse's 
U.S. operations, foresaw the development of legislation in this 
country that would be patterned after the British example. In an 
article published in 1902, he stated:
It may well be that legislation will eventually be necessary 
before complete protections are assured to the public. But 
all those who are against government interference with private 
enterprises, while desiring to compel reasonable publicity in 
the affairs of commercial undertakings, can direct this 
legislation to safe channels by using their influence to so 
firmly establish the principle of independent audits by public 
accountants that the state will merely have to make compulsory 
a course of action already adopted by the majority of well- 
managed enterprises.10/
The use of independent audits did increase in the U.S. and by 
April 1932 all corporations applying for listing on the New York 
Stock Exchange ("NYSE") were asked by the NYSE to agree to have 
their future financial statements audited by independent public 
accountants.11/ When the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act") 
was adopted, the financial statements of eighty-five percent of the 
companies listed on the NYSE were audited by independent public 
accountants.12/
9 / Previts, supra, at 33.
10/ Id. at 30 quoting Dickinson, "Duties and Responsibilities of 
the Public Accountant," in The English View of Accountants' 
Duties and Responsibilities: 1881-1902. ed. Michael Chatfield, 
New York: A m o ,  1978, at 153-160.
1 1 /  L. Rappaport, SEC Accounting Practice and Procedure. 26.3- 
26.4 (The Ronald Press Company, 3d ed. 1972). Attempts by the 
NYSE to require all listed companies to have their financial 
statements audited, however, had failed. See, Part 4, Stock 
Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 239, 
Resolutions to Thoroughly Investigate Practices of Stock 
Exchanges with Respect to the Buying and Selling and the 
Borrowing and Lending of Listed Securities, the Values of Such 
Securities and the Effects of Such Practices, Before a 
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 
72d Cong., 2d Sess., 1356-1358 (January 11 and 12, 1933).
12/ See, Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Committee on Banking 
and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., at 60 (1933) ("1933 Senate 
Hearings").
6Prior to the enactment of the 1933 Act, however, there were 
few if any professional rules in this Country defining the scope 
of auditor independence. This may have been because practitioners 
considered independence to be a "habitual state of mind,” or a 
"cultural ought. " 1 3 /  It was believed unwise to assume someone was 
independent merely if he or she followed a few specific rules; just 
as it was considered unwise to assume that anyone who participated 
in a particular activity always would not be independent. 14/ Also, 
as there was no legal requirement to be independent of audit 
clients, there was no compelling need for clear tests of 
independence.
Despite the lack of specific rules prior to 1933, the meaning 
and scope of "independence" actively was being debated. As today, 
a main controversy concerned the expansion of advisory services 
versus the need for public confidence in the audit process. In 
1925, Arthur Andersen (founder of the firm bearing his name) said:
[T]he businessman has found that advice from an accounting 
viewpoint may have high cash value in the form of taxes saved 
or refunded, war contracts liquidated, in recapitalizations 
and refinancings effected advantageously.... The present* 
day accountant who is alert will grasp every opportunity to 
foster this attitude by increasing the constructive value of 
all normal work and seeking newer and broader fields of 
service to business management. 15/
Herbert Freeman, however, cautioned that accountants should 
not accept engagements that "lead them into the executive field" 
or "charge them with the responsibilities of administration" until 
the "status of the profession is established by legislative 
action."16/ That legislative action began in 1933.
When members of the accounting profession appeared before 
Congress in 1933 to argue that the financial statements of public 
companies should be required to be audited by "independent
13/ Previts, supra, at 42-43.
14/ Id. As late as 1932, the accounting profession disapproved 
a proposed professional resolution indicating that dual roles 
of auditor and director or officer of a corporation tend to 
destroy the auditor's independence. Rappaport, supra, at 
26.2-26.3.
15/ Previts, supra, at 45 quoting reprint of the address, A. 
Andersen, "The Accountant's Function as Business Adviser, " The 
Journal of Accountancy, at 18-19 (January 1926).
16/ Id. at 46-47.
7accountants," Congress was able to find support for their arguments 
in British law and the practice of eighty-five percent of NYSE 
companies.17/ With these examples, and what Congress undoubtedly 
felt was a lack of controversy in requiring such audits, it is not 
surprising that the issue is not addressed in House, Senate, or 
Conference Reports regarding the initial adoption of the Federal 
securities laws.18/ At related hearings, however, Congress briefly 
did consider establishing a corps of government auditors who would 
verify corporate account balances of public companies and review 
company books. After hearing testimony from representatives of the 
accounting profession that the profession could perform such tasks 
more effectively, and at less cost, Congress chose to entrust the 
accounting profession with the responsibility for auditing the 
financial statements of Commission registrants.19/
The Federal Trade Commission, immediately following adoption 
of the 1933 Act and prior to the formation of the SEC, issued a 
regulation under the 1933 Act providing that an accountant would 
not be considered independent with respect to any person with whom 
the accountant had any interest, directly or indirectly, or with 
whom the accountant Was connected as an officer, agent, employee, 
promoter, underwriter, trustee, partner, director, or a person 
performing a similar function.20/
Practically since its inception, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has addressed auditor independence issues. For example, 
in the 1936 case of In the Matter of Cornucopia Gold Mines.21/ the
17/ 1933 Senate Hearings at 56-60. See generally, J. Wiesen, The
Securities Acts and Independent Auditors: What Did Congress
Intend? (a research study prepared for the Commission on 
Auditors' Responsibilities, AICPA, 1978).
18/ Id. See also, B. Committee, Independence of Accountants and 
Legislative Intent. 41 Ad. L. Rev. 33, 37 (1989).
19/ 1933 Senate Hearings at 55-60. During one hearing, Col. A.H.
Carter, then president of the New York State Society of 
Certified Public Accountants, stressed the fact that outside 
accounting firms would be independent of management. During 
this discussion, Col. Carter, in differentiating between 
controllers employed by companies and independent accountants, 
stated, "the public accountant audits the controller's 
accountant." Senator Barkley then asked, "Who audits you?" 
Col. Carter's often quoted reply was, "Our conscience." 1933 
Senate Hearings at 58.
20/ Federal Trade Commission, Rules and Regulations Under the 
Securities Act of 1933. Article 14 (July 6, 1933).
21/ 1 SEC 364 (1936).
8Commission referred to several business relationships 22/ between 
the accountant and the registrant and determined that the 
accountant was not independent. In response to arguments by 
counsel for the accountants that the certification was not material 
to investors, the Commission stated:
A certification is a material fact. It signifies that the 
contents of the financial statements to which it is appended 
have been checked and verified within the limits stated in the 
certificate. To make such certification truly protective of 
the interests of security holders and investors the 
requirement under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, is 
that it be made by an "independent public or certified 
accountant.” The insistence of the Act on a certification by 
an "independent" accountant signifies the real function which 
certification should perform. That function is the submission 
to an independent and impartial mind of the accounting 
practices and policies of registrants. The history of finance 
well illustrates the importance and need for submission to 
such impartial persons of the accounting practices and 
policies of the management to the end that present and 
prospective security holders will be protected against unsound 
accounting practices and procedure and will be afforded, as 
nearly as accounting conventions will permit, the truth about 
the financial condition of the enterprise which issues the 
securities. Accordingly, the certification gives a minimum 
of protection against untruths and half-truths which otherwise 
would more easily creep into financial statements. Hence a 
statement which serves such a high function cannot be 
dismissed under the Act as a mere "tag" attached to financial 
statements. It is a material fact, for it gives meaning and 
reliability to financial data and makes less likely misleading 
or untrue financial statements.23/
Later in the same year, the Commission found an accountant to 
have "consciously falsified the facts" and therefore not to be
22./ Among other things, the accounting firm received a set fee 
plus one percent of the registrant's sales of certain metals 
for one year. The accounting firm installed the registrant's 
accounting system and furnished the registrant with office 
space, as well as audited the registrant's financial 
statements. In addition, the person in charge of the audit 
simultaneously was made comptroller of the registrant and 
owned shares of the registrant's common stock. Id. at 365- 
366.
23/ Id. at 367.
independent. 24/ In discussing the independence issue the 
Commission said:
[T]he methods and results of his auditing work cause us to 
doubt whether any presumption of independence, which the 
absence of relational or contractual connection with
registrant would normally justify, can be indulged here___
[W]here the accountant has consciously falsified the facts, 
as here, an inference of actual absence of independence would 
seem to be justified.... Protection of investors in these 
situations requires not only that these fiduciaries be free 
of entangling alliances which relational and contractual 
connections with registrants frequently engender, but also 
that they approach their task with complete objectivity - 
critical of the practices and procedures of registrants, and 
unwilling to aid and abet in making statements which the facts 
do not warrant.25/
From the very beginning, therefore, the Commission emphasized 
the need for auditors to be independent. On May 6, 1937, the 
Commission issued Accounting Series Release No. ("ASR") 2. In this 
release, the Commission stated:
The Securities and Exchange Commission from time to time has 
been called upon to determine whether, in a particular case, 
the relationship existing between a registrant and an
9
24/ In the Matter of American Terminals and Transit Company, 1 
SEC 701, 707 (1936).
25/ Id. The reference by the Commission in this excerpt to the 
independent accountants as "fiduciaries" is consistent with 
section 11(c) the 1933 Act. As originally enacted, this 
subsection stated that the "degree of reasonableness" required 
of those persons listed in section 11, including accountants 
who prepare or certify any part of the registration statement, 
"shall be that required of a person occupying a fiduciary 
relationship.” See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 
5 (1933), which states that "the essential characteristic [of 
the civil liabilities imposed by the 1933 Act] consists of a 
requirement that all those responsible for statements upon the 
face of which the public is solicited to invest its money 
shall be held to standards like those imposed by law upon a 
fiduciary." In 1934, this language was amended to state that 
the standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a 
prudent man in the management of his own property. See H.R. 
Rep. No. 1838, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1934), which states, 
"The amendment to section 11(c) [of the Securities Act of 
1933] removes possible uncertainties as to the standard of 
reasonableness by substituting for the present language the 
accepted common law definition of the duty of a fiduciary."
10
accountant was of such a nature as to prevent him from being 
considered independent for the purpose of certifying financial 
statements to be filed in connection with the registration of 
securities under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.
In response to such requests, the Commission has taken the 
position that an accountant can not be deemed to be 
independent if he is, or has been during the period under 
review, an officer or director of the registrant or if he 
holds an interest in the registrant that is significant with 
respect to its total capital or his own personal fortune.26/
In February 1940, the Commission consolidated several sets of 
accounting instructions from various forms into a single accounting 
regulation, Regulation S-X.27/ Article 2 of this Regulation was 
entitled "Certification," with Rule 2-01(b) stating that the 
Commission would not recognize any accountant as independent who 
is not in fact independent. This rule further stated,
An accountant will not be considered independent with respect 
to any person in whom he has any substantial interest, direct 
or indirect, or with whom he is, or was during the period of 
report, connected as a promoter, underwriter, voting trustee, 
director, officer, or employee.
With various amendments, this rule continues today.28/
26/ The Federal Trade Commission rule specifying that an auditor 
would "not be considered” independent if certain relationships 
exist, and the SEC's early use of language regarding a 
"presumption" of independence, an "inference of actual absence 
of independence" (In the Matter of American Terminals and 
Transit Company, supra), and when an accountant "can not be 
deemed" to be independent (ASR 2, supra), suggest that the 
appearance of independence, as well as the fact of 
independence, was a consideration in initial independence 
determinations. Subsequently, the need for auditors to 
maintain the appearance of independence was written expressly 
into the Commission's interpretations and the auditors' 
professional literature. See, e.g., ASR 126 (July 6, 1972), 
ASR 165 (December 20, 1974), ASR 296 (August 20, 1981), and 
the discussion of the AICPA's independence requirements, 
infra.
27 / ASR 12 (February 21, 1940); see SEC, Sixth Annual Report of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, at 170-171 (1940).
28/ See discussion of SEC independence requirements infra.
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The Commission continued its consideration of auditor's 
independence in cases such as McKesson & Robbins. in which it 
talked of the "degree of independence which [the Commission] 
deem[s] necessary for the protection of investors" and described 
procedural safeguards (such as the use of audit committees) that 
would enhance auditor independence.29/ In this case, the 
Commission emphasized the philosophy under the Federal securities 
laws that auditors are to be governed primarily by their 
responsibilities to public investors, rather than by any 
obligations the auditors previously may have felt were owed to 
management. The Commission stated:
In approaching his work with respect to companies which file 
with us or in which there is a large public interest, the 
auditor must realize that, regardless of what his position and 
obligations might have been when reporting to managers or 
owner-managers, he must now recognize fully his responsibility 
to public investors by including the activities of the 
management itself within the scope of his work and by 
reporting thereon to investors....
Further, the adoption of the specific recommendations made in 
this report as to the type of disclosure to be made in the 
accountant's certificate and as to the election of accountants 
by stockholders should insure ... that accountants will be 
more independent of management.30/
In the Hollander case the following year, the Commission 
discussed situations that "may cast grave doubts on the 
independence of an accountant. "31/ In this case the Commission 
also said:
[O]ne of the purposes of requiring a certificate by an 
independent public accountant is to remove the possibility of 
impalpable and unprovable biases which an accountant may 
unconsciously acquire because of his nonprofessional contacts 
with his client. The requirement for certification by an 
independent public accountant is not so much a guarantee 
against conscious falsification or intentional deception as 
it is a measure to insure complete objectivity. It is in part 
to protect the accounting profession from the implication that 
slight carelessness or the choice of a debatable accounting 
procedure is the result of bias or lack of independence that
29/ In the Matter of McKesson & Robbins. ASR 19 (December 5, 
1940).
30/ Id.
31/ In the Matter of A. Hollander & Son, Inc.. 8 SEC 586, 612 
(1941).
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this Commission has in its prior decisions adopted objective 
standards. Viewing our requirements in this light, any 
inferences of a personal nature that may be directed against 
specific members of the accounting profession depend upon the 
facts of a particular case and do not flow from the 
undifferentiated application of uniform objective 
standards.32/
The Commission noted significant stockholdings by the auditors 
in the Hollander companies and stated that these holdings "preclude 
[the accountants] from being regarded as an independent public 
accountant with respect to the registrant___ "33/
In 1944, the Commission issued a release summarizing 
additional independence rulings, stating:
Certain relationships between an accountant and his client 
appear so apt to prevent the accountant from reviewing the 
financial statements and accounting procedures of a registrant 
with complete objectivity that the Commission has taken the 
position that existence of these relationships will preclude 
its finding that the accountant is, in fact, independent.34/
32 /  Id. at 613.
33/ Id. at 614. ASR 22 (March 14, 1941) restated many of the 
ideas in the Hollander case and reviewed other cases where 
relationships and situations, beyond those set forth in Rule 
2 -01(b), had prevented an accountant from being considered 
independent for the purpose of certifying financial statements 
filed by a particular registrant. These situations included 
being an unsalaried employee of the registrant, being a 
shareholder of the registrant, being an employee of a 
shareholder of the registrant, consciously falsifying facts, 
being completely subordinate to the judgments of the 
registrant, making loans to and receiving loans from officers 
and directors of the registrant, and receiving a letter of 
indemnification from the registrant.
34/ ASR 47, "Independence of Certifying Accountants - Summary of 
Past Releases of the Commission and a Compilation of Hitherto 
Unpublished Cases or Inquiries Arising Under Several of the 
Acts Administered by the Commission" (January 25, 1944).
These rulings also emphasized the disqualifying aspects of 
interests held by an accountant's spouse and partners in the 
accounting firm.
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In addition, in its Annual Report for 1944, the Commission 
elaborated on the importance of auditor independence.35/ The 
Commission stated, in part:
The maintenance of high standards of professional conduct on 
the part of the public accountants who certify financial 
statements is a matter of the utmost importance to persons who 
rely on these statements. The reader of a financial statement 
has a right to expect that the certifying accountant has done 
his work expertly and impartially and that his opinion as to 
the financial statements is forthright and unbiased....
One cornerstone of proper professional conduct is that the 
accountant shall be independent of the client whose financial 
statements he certifies. This view has long been held by many 
individual accountants but was explicitly introduced in the 
Securities Act of 1933 as a necessary prerequisite to the 
certification of financial statements filed under that Act. 
This need for independence has also been given statutory 
recognition in the other principal acts administered by the 
Commission. The goal of such a principle is obvious--the 
accountant's opinion, if it is to be valuable to the reader 
of financial statements, must be arrived at objectively and 
expressed impartially.
... The Commission, however, has viewed the requirement of 
independence not only as a safeguard against conscious 
falsification but also as a preventive of impalpable and 
unprovable biases in the exercise of his professional judgment 
which may arise as a result of incompatible interests or 
relationships. Consequently, the Commission has found an 
accountant to be lacking in independence with respect to a 
particular registrant if the relationships which exist between 
the accountant and the client are such as to create a 
reasonable doubt as to whether the accountant will or can have 
an impartial and objective judgment on the questions 
confronting him.36/
During this time period, the accounting profession also 
continued its consideration of auditor independence issues. In 
1947, Mr. John L. Carey, the American Institute's former chief 
staff officer, wrote the following, insightful definition of 
independence:
Independence is an abstract concept, and it is difficult to 
define either generally or in its peculiar application to the
35./ SEC, Tenth Annual Report of the Securities_and Exchange
Commission. 205-207 (1944).
3 6/ Id. at 205.
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certified public accountant. Essentially, it is a state of 
mind. It is partly synonymous with honesty, integrity, 
courage, character. It means, in simplest terms, that the 
certified public accountant will tell the truth as he sees it, 
and will permit no influence, financial or sentimental, to 
turn him from that course. Everyone will applaud this ideal, 
but a cynical world requires more than a mere declaration of 
intention if it is to stake its money on the accountant's 
word. Therefore, the profession has laid its heaviest 
penalties on those who breach the unwritten contract of 
independence, and, in addition, has proscribed specific acts 
and modes of behavior which might raise a question as to the 
independence of its members. In other words, the rules do not 
only provide for punishment of members who are not 
independent; they also prohibit conduct which might arouse a 
suspicion of lack of independence. Objective standards of 
independence have thus been introduced into the code. It is 
not enough for the member to do what he thinks is right. He 
must also avoid behavior which could lead to an inference that 
he might be subject to improper influences. The accounting 
profession must be like Caesar's wife. To be suspected is 
almost as bad as to be convicted.37/
Over the years, the Commission has maintained the course 
plotted by these early rationale. For example, in 1964, the 
Commission, in issuing a stop order under the 1933 Act, stated:
The requirement in Schedule A [of the 1933 Act] of 
certification by an independent accountant is intended to 
secure for the benefit of public investors the detached 
objectivity of a disinterested person. Rule 17 CFR 210.2- 
01(c) of our Regulation S-X, which sets forth the requirements 
applicable to the form and content of financial statements 
filed as part of a registration statement, states that in 
considering the independence of certifying accountants we will 
give appropriate consideration to all relevant circumstances, 
including evidence bearing on all relationships between the 
certifying accountants and the registrant or any affiliate of 
registrant. "The certifying accountant must be one who is in 
no way connected with the business or its management and who 
does not have any relationship that might affect the 
independence which at times may require him to voice public 
criticisms of his client's accounting practices. "38/
37/ John L. Carey, Professional Ethics of Public Accounting 7 
(AICPA 1947).
38/ In the Matter of South Bay Industries. Inc.. 42 SEC 83, 87 
(1964), quoting American Finance Company, Inc., 40 SEC 1043, 
1049 (1962).
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ASR 296, issued on August 20, 1981, reaffirmed the 
Commission's dedication to the task of assuring auditor 
independence in fact and appearance. The Commission states in this 
release:
An auditor is deemed to be independent if he is independent 
in fact and if he appears to be independent. He must act in 
an unbiased and objective manner and he must be free of any 
financial or other interest which would create the perception 
that he may not be independent.
"Independent auditors should not only be independent in fact; 
they should avoid situations that may lead outsiders to doubt 
their independence.” [Quoting Statement on Auditing Standards 
No. 1.] The Commission continues to endorse and require 
scrupulous adherence to these principles. The Commission 
views both the fact and appearance of independence as 
essential in order that the public may justifiably view the 
audit process as a wholly unbiased review of management's 
presentation of the corporate financial picture.... Absent 
independence, in fact and appearance, investors will have 
little confidence in public companies as investment 
vehicles.... If the auditor is predisposed, or even appears 
predisposed, to blindly validate management's work rather than 
subjecting it to careful scrutiny, the ultimate result will 
be a diminution of public confidence in the profession and the 
integrity of the securities markets.
The independence of the public accountant - both in fact and 
appearance - is critical to his role under the federal 
securities laws. Independence is the essential attribute of 
the auditor because, absent independence, the auditor's skills 
and services are of little value. The Commission has the 
responsibility and authority under the securities laws to 
assure that accountants who practice before it are independent 
and, therefore, is prepared to take further action if either 
the fact or appearance of accountants' independence is 
questioned seriously in the future.
Three years later, the U.S. Supreme Court also emphasized the 
role of the independent auditor under the Federal securities 
laws.39/ In finding that there is no accountant work-product 
immunity for accountants' tax accrual workpapers, and no Federal 
accountant-client privilege, the Court contrasted the role of the 
accountant versus that of a lawyer. The court stated that a lawyer 
is a confidential adviser and advocate, with a duty to present the 
client's case in the most favorable light. The court then stated:
39/ United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
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An independent certified public accountant performs a 
different role. By certifying the public reports that 
collectively depict a corporation's financial status, the 
independent auditor assumes a public responsibility 
transcending any employment relationship with the client. The 
independent public accountant performing this special function 
owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and 
stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This 
"public watchdog” function demands that the accountant 
maintain total independence from the client at all times and 
requires complete fidelity to the public trust. To insulate 
from disclosure a certified public accountant's 
interpretations of the client's financial statements would be 
to ignore the significance of the accountant's role as a 
disinterested analyst charged with public obiigations.40/
The Court in this case also noted that the Commission requires 
that financial statements of registrants be audited "in order to 
obviate the fear of loss from reliance on inaccurate information, 
thereby encouraging public investment in the Nation's 
industries."41/ The Court then emphasized the vital importance of 
the appearance of an auditor's independence to the investing 
public, by stating:
It is therefore not enough that financial statements be 
accurate; the public must also perceive them as being 
accurate. Public faith in the reliability of a corporation's 
financial statements depends upon the public perception of the 
outside auditor as an independent professional. Endowing the 
workpapers of an independent auditor with a work-product 
immunity would destroy the appearance of auditor's 
independence by creating the impression that the auditor is 
an advocate for the corporate client. If investors were to 
view the auditor as an advocate for the corporate client, the 
value of the audit function itself might well be lost .42/
Recent Enforcement of the Commission's Independence Requirements
From the 1936 cases of In the Matter of Cornucopia Gold Mines 
and In the Matter of American Terminals and Transit Company
discussed above, to cases under investigation today, the Commission 
consistently has taken and is taking enforcement and disciplinary 
action when registrants and their auditors have violated the 
independence requirements in the Federal securities laws. Within 
the last five years the Commission has brought such actions when,
40/ Id. at 817-818.
41/ Id. at 819 n. 15.
42/ Id.
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in its view: auditors lacked the appropriate degree of professional 
skepticism when auditing clients' financial statements. 43 / auditors 
had financial interests in audit clients. 44/ auditors have borrowed 
money, directly or indirectly, from their audit clients.45/ audit 
clients had material lease arrangements with partnerships composed 
of partners in the accounting firm. 46/ auditors acted as nominee 
shareholders for officers or directors of audit clients,47/ 
auditors performed functions that should have been performed by 
management,48/ auditors assumed the incompatible role of legal 
counsel for the company,49/ auditors acted as the company's 
internal accountant and attempted to audit their own accounting 
work,50/ auditors have been financially dependent on the audit 
client,51/ and in other situations.
For example, on July 15, 1993, the Commission settled a 
disciplinary proceeding pursuant to Rule 2 (e) of its Rules of
43/ In the Matter of Fred V. Schiemann. CPA. Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Release No. ("AAER") 488 (September 29, 
1993).
44/ In the Matter of D. Spencer Nilson, CPA. AAER 364 (March 31,
1992). See also In the Matter of Bill R. Thomas. AAER 192 
(May 27, 1988).
45/ In the Matter of Robert J. Iomazzo. CPA. AAER 437 (January 12,
1993) and AAER 385 (May 22, 1992); SEC v. Ernst & Young, AAER
301 (June 13, 1991); and In the Matter of Frederick D.
Woodside, AAER 244 (August 21, 1989).
46 / SEC v. Ernst & Young, AAER 301 (June 13, 1991).
47/ SEC v. Superior Resources. Inc., et al., AAER 419 (September 
22, 1992).
48/ In the Matter of Michael R. Ford. CPA. AAER 302 (June 17, 
1991) and AAER 297 (May 6, 1991).
49/ In the Matter of Samuel George Greenspan. CPA, AAER 312
(August 26, 1991) and AAER 298 (May 23, 1991).
5 0/ In the Matter of Thomas P. Reynolds. LTD. and Milton A.
Netcher. AAER 333 (September 16, 1991); In the Matter of
Terrance M. Wahl, AAER 321 (September 30, 1991); and In the 
Matter of Noemi L. Rodriquez Santos, AAER 246 (September 1, 
1989).
51/ In the Matter of Bernard Taraowsky, AAER 467 (July 15, 1993) 
and In the Matter of Terrance M. Wahl. AAER 321 (September 30, 
1991).
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Practice 52/ in which the auditor was alleged to have violated the 
Commission's independence requirements by being financially 
dependent on the registrant and making decisions normally made by 
company employees.53/ The Commission determined that the auditor 
in this case derived approximately seventy-five percent of his 
annual income from the registrant, which was the auditor's only 
audit client. The Commission also found that the auditor was the 
registrant's sole source of expert advice on accounting matters and 
that the auditor, rather than the registrant's employees, made 
certain decisions regarding the preparation of the registrant's 
financial statements. The auditor was denied the privilege of 
practicing before the Commission with the right to apply for 
permission to resume such practice after 18 months and the 
fulfillment of certain specified conditions.
In another recent case, the Commission found that an auditor 
was not independent because of certain loans he had received from 
his audit client.54 / The Commission ordered that this auditor be
52/ 17 CFR §201.2(e).
53/ In the Matter of Bernard Tarnowskv, AAER 467 (July 15, 1993).
54 / In the Matter of Robert J. Iommazzo, CPA. AAER 437 (January 
12, 1993). In related private litigation, the court, ruling 
on defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can  be gran ted amd failure to 
plead fraud with particularity, stated that the allegation 
that an "auditor working in a secondary review capacity had 
owed outstanding debts to [the thrift] ... fuels plaintiffs' 
contention that the [thrift] defendants an d [the accounting 
firm] engaged in a joint attempt to fraudulently inflate the 
price of [the thrift's] stock." Lerch v. Citizens First
Bancorp., Inc., et al., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶97,258, at page 95,171 (D.N.J. 1992). The court further held 
that plaintiffs' complaint plead fraud in sufficient detail 
by, among other things, "explaining the context of [the 
accounting firm's] sending as one of its auditors of [the 
thrift] an individual in default of substan tial money to [the 
thrift]." Id. The court noted:
First of all, it is undisputed that Robert Iamuzzo (sic), 
[the accounting firm's] auditor working in a secondary 
capacity on [the thrift's] audit, was indebted to [the 
thrift] for millions of dollars. If [the accounting 
firm] knew of this indebtedness, then it clearly did 
violate the requirement that am auditor be independent. 
Moreover, once such a suspicious scenario is alleged, it 
is perfectly reasonable to inquire, through discovery, 
about the extent of the relationship between [the thrift]
(continued...)
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denied for a period of ten years the privilege of appearing before 
the Commission as an independent public accountant, and denied for 
a period of five years the privilege of appearing before the 
Commission as a preparer of financial statements. The Commission's 
opinion in this case stated:
[I]ndependence of public accountants is critical to the
Commission's reporting process and to the securities markets 
which the Commission regulates. The entire framework of the 
federal securities laws is premised on fair and adequate 
disclosure of material facts. Audits by independent 
accountants are an important method by which the disclosure 
requirements are implemented. As the Commission previously 
has said, "The Commission has historically considered the 
independence of the auditors who examine financial statements 
filed with the Commission as central to the effective 
implementation of the federal securities laws.” [Quoting ASR 
296.] Audit reports by independent accountants "provide the 
assurance of an outside expert's examination and opinion, 
thereby substantially increasing, the reliability of financial 
statements." [Quoting ASR 165.]
These cases are typical of the Commission's strong, persistent 
enforcement presence in the area of auditor independence.
While the Commission has adequate statutory authority to 
maintain these efforts, certain pending legislative initiatives 
could serve to strengthen the Commission's enforcement program 
regarding auditor independence as well as other areas of fraudulent 
financial reporting. For example, current legislative initiatives 
by Congressmen Markey, Dingell, and Wyden, Senator Kerry, and 
others, further may enhance auditor independence by providing 
auditors with the means, and requiring auditors under penalty of 
law, to report directly to the Commission certain uncorrected 
illegal acts by their audit clients.55/ This legislation also may
54/(...continued)
and [the accounting firm], particularly between [the 
thrift] and any particular employees of [the accounting 
firm].
Id. at n. 12, pages 95,171-95,172.
55/ H.R. 574, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), and S. 630, 103rd 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), would require each audit under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to include, "in accordance 
with generally accepted auditing standards, as may be modified 
or supplemented from time to time by the Commission," 
procedures regarding the detection of certain illegal acts, 
procedures for the identification of certain related party
(continued...)
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have broader enforcement implications. In another vein, the 
Commission has sought an exemption from the asserted application 
of certain procurement requirements to its engagement of expert 
witnesses to testify in auditor independence and other cases. Such 
an exemption would clarify the Commission's contracting authority, 
facilitate the retention of the most credible witnesses to support 
the Commission's cases, and avoid the risk of premature disclosure 
of the staff's litigation theory and strategies. The staff 
encourages continued consideration of a statutory exemption in this 
area.
Disclosure Requirements
In addition to considering independence from an enforcement 
and interpretive vantage point, over the years the Commission has 
undertaken several rulemaking proceedings that have had the effect 
of strengthening auditors' independence. Examples include 
disclosures related to the use of audit committees, the resignation 
or dismissal of a registrant's primary auditor, and the auditor's 
provision of management advisory services.56/
Audit Committees.
The Commission historically has encouraged the use of audit 
committees composed of independent d i r e c t o r s .57/ An effective
5/(...continued)
transactions, and an evaluation regarding the registrant's 
ability to continue as a going concern. These bills also 
would require a registrant to notify the Commission within one 
business day after its auditor reports to the registrant's 
board of directors that the auditor reasonably expects either 
to resign or to qualify its audit report due to an illegal 
act, committed by the registrant, that has a material effect 
on the registrant's financial statements. If the registrant 
would fail to notify the Commission that the board of 
directors received such an "illegal acts report" from its 
auditor, then the auditor, within the next business day, would 
be required to provide a copy of that illegal acts report 
directly to the Commission.
56/ Additional proxy statement disclosures, whenever there is to 
be an election of directors or the election, approval, or 
ratification of the auditors, include whether the auditors 
will attend the shareholders' meeting and have the opportunity 
to make a statement, and whether the auditors will be 
available to respond to questions at that meeting. Item 9, 
S c h e d u l e  1 4 A ,  1 7  C F R  2 4 0 . 1 4 a - 1 0 1 .
57 / See In the Matter of McKesson & Robbins, Inc., supra; and ASR 
123 (March 23, 1972).
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audit committee may enhance the auditor's independence by, among 
other things, providing a forum apart from management where the 
auditors may discuss their concerns, recommending or approving the 
selection of the independent auditors, and facilitating 
communications among the Board of Directors, management, and 
internal and independent auditors.58/
Accordingly, the Commission requires disclosure, in connection 
with the solicitation of proxies, of information concerning an 
audit committee's members, functions, and number of meetings.59/ 
Additional information that must be disclosed regarding audit 
committees includes whether a registrant's audit committee 
recommended or approved a change in accountants, and whether the 
audit committee consulted with the former accountant concerning 
disagreements with management and certain other matters.60/
Also, pursuant to the Commission's rulemaking and oversight 
authority, the Commission has approved the national securities 
exchanges' various audit committee requirements. Currently, the 
New York Stock Exchange and the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
require listed companies to have audit committees composed entirely 
of independent directors.61/ The National Association of
58/ See SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Staff Report on 
Corporate Accountability, printed for the use of the Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 486-510 (1980); Securities and Exchange
Commission Report to Congress on the Accounting Profession and 
the Commission's Oversight Role, Prepared for the Subcommittee 
on Governmental Efficiency and the District of Columbia of the 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 96-101 (1978); Letter from SEC Chairman David S. Ruder 
to Mr. Joseph R. Hardiman, President, National Association of 
Securities Dealers, Inc. (December 7, 1988). See also,Report 
of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
at 41-42 and Appendix I, "Good Practice Guidelines for the 
Audit Committee" (October 1987), and J. Bacon, The Audit 
Committee: A Broader Mandate (a research report prepared for 
The Conference Board, 1988).
59/ Item 7(e) of Schedule 14A, 17 CFR 240.14a-101.
60/ Item 304 of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.304; item 304 of 
Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.304.
61/ The original petition by the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
("CBOE") contained a recommendation that listed issuers 
maintain audit committees composed of independent directors. 
The final rules were strengthened to require all listed 
issuers to maintain such committees. Exchange Act Release No.
(continued...)
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Securities Dealers, with respect to all national market system 
companies, the American Stock Exchange, with limited exceptions, 
and the Chicago Stock Exchange, with respect to all companies, 
require that listed companies have audit committees with a majority 
of independent directors.
Auditor Resignation or Dismissal.
Since the early 1970s, the Commission has required disclosures 
that have discouraged the practice of changing auditors to obtain 
more favorable accounting treatment. 62/ and provided a forum for 
the auditor, upon leaving the audit engagement. 63/ to note material 
events and disagreements with management that may not have been 
disclosed by the registrant.
In 1971, the Commission first proposed that registrants 
disclose whenever a new principal auditor was engaged and "the 
reasons for the change" in auditors.64/ Commentators, however, 
objected to stating in each instance the "reasons for the change" 
in auditors, and the adopted disclosure was limited to 
"disagreements" between the auditor and the registrant that are 
related to the purposes of the Federal securities laws. 
Specifically, disclosure was required of:
any disagreements with the former principal accountant on any 
matter of accounting principles or practices, financial 
statement disclosure, or auditing procedure, which
61/(...continued)
28556 (October 19, 1990) [55 FR 43233]. The Commission
release states, "The Commission   believes that independent
audit committees should enhance the reliability of financial 
disclosures and the credibility of financial information." 
Id. at 55 FR 43237.
62/ ASR 165, supra.
63/ In an ongoing auditor-client relationship the auditor may 
publicize its material concerns regarding the financial 
statements in a modified audit report. When the auditor 
resigns or is dismissed before a current audit report is 
issued, however, that opportunity to alert the public is not 
available. The Commission's regulations fill this gap by 
providing a reporting mechanism upon the change in a 
registrant's independent accountants.
64/ Exchange Act Release No. 9169 (May 6, 1971). In this release, 
the Commission noted that it was considering whether the 
registrant's statement of the reason for the change and the 
letter from the former accountant should be made public or 
treated as non-public.
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disagreements if not resolved to the satisfaction of the 
former accountant would have caused him to make reference in 
connection with his opinion to the subject matter of the 
disagreement.65/
These disclosure requirements have been amended on several 
occasions. For example, in 1974 the Commission extended the 
disclosure requirement to: (1) be triggered also by (i) the 
resignation or dismissal of the principal accountants or their 
declination to stand for re-election after completion of the 
current audit (previously, disclosure was required only upon the 
engagement of a new auditor) and (ii) changes in the independent 
accountants for significant subsidiaries on whom the principal 
accountant expressed reliance in its audit report, (2) include a 
statement regarding whether the audit reports for either of the 
last two years contained an adverse opinion or a disclaimer of 
opinion, (3) cover changes in accountants during the two most 
recent fiscal years (the previous period was eighteen months), (4) 
include a description of all disagreements, even those 
disagreements that have been resolved to the former accountant's 
satisfaction, and (5) construe the definition of the term 
"disagreements" broadly to include, among other things, situations 
where the accountant has advised the registrant that either the 
registrant lacks sufficient internal controls necessary to develop 
reliable financial statements or the accountant has discovered 
facts that have led the accountant to be willing no longer to rely 
on management's representations or to be associated with 
management's financial statements.66/
65/ Exchange Act Release No. 9344 (September 27, 1971).
Approximately seven years later, the Commission reconsidered 
whether to require disclosure of the "reasons for all changes 
in independent accountants” rather than disclosure of only 
"disagreements." ASR 247 (May 26, 1978). Commentators again 
opposed this disclosure for a variety of reasons, arguing that 
the disclosure would not be useful and that meaningful 
information would not be presented. These commentators 
indicated that disclosure would be boiler-plate (for example, 
"auditor rotation policy," "need a fresh look," "poor 
service,” or "high fees”), that such disclosures would obscure 
the disclosure of disagreements then required, and that candid 
disclosures would not be made for fear of litigation involving 
libel or other allegations. They also argued that the 
proposal might tend to inhibit changes in accountants. The 
Commission stated that it did not endorse all the arguments 
made by the commentators. Nonetheless, disclosure of the 
reasons for all changes in accountants was not adopted. Id.
66/ ASR 165, supra, which states:
(continued...)
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In April 1988, the Commission further expanded these 
disclosures to include certain potential opinion shopping 
situations, to clarify the circumstances in which registrants are 
deemed to have had disclosable disagreements with their former 
accountants, and to require disclosure of both "reportable events" 67/ 
and certain issues the registrant discussed with the newly engaged 
auditor prior to the date of engagement.68/
Currently, item 304 of Regulation S-K contains the substantive 
disclosure requirements concerning changes in a registrant's 
certifying accountant .69/ Although this item is incorporated into 
several forms and reports.70/ the disclosure generally is made 
under Item 4 of Form 8-K 71/ due to the requirement that this form 
must be filed within five business days after the resignation,
66/(...continued)
It is essential that both the fact and the appearance of 
independence be sustained so that the confidence of the 
investing public in the reliability of audited financial 
statements and the integrity of the public accounting 
profession will be maintained. To this end, the 
Commission has concluded that it is desirable to increase 
the level of disclosure regarding the relationships 
between independent accountants and their clients.
6 7/ Reportable events involve situations where the accountant has 
advised the registrant that it: questions the reliability of 
the registrant's financial statements or management's 
representations; believes that sufficient internal controls 
do not exist to develop reliable financial statements; needs 
to expand the scope of the audit to investigate certain 
matters; or, has concluded that certain information that has 
come to its attention materially impacts the fairness or 
reliability of current or past audit reports or the financial 
statements underlying those reports. See item 304(a)(1)(v) 
of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.304(a)(1)(v).
68/ Financial Reporting Release No. ("FRR") 31 (April 12, 1988).
69/ 17 CFR 229.304. Substantially the same disclosures are
required of small business issuers under item 304 of 
Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.304.
70/ Item 304, Regulation S-K, information is required by Forms S- 
1, S-2, S-4, and S-11 under the Securities Act of 1933 and 
Forms 10 and 10-K and Schedule 14A under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. Item 304, Regulation S-B, information 
is required by Forms SB-1, SB-2, 10-SB, and 10-KSB.
71/ 17 CFR 249.308.
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dismissal, or declination of the former accountant to stand for re- 
election, or the engagement of a new certifying accountant.72/
As noted above, item 304(a) disclosures include, among other 
things: whether the former accountant resigned, declined to stand 
for re-election, or was dismissed, and the date thereof; whether 
the former accountant qualified his or her audit report or 
disclaimed an opinion during the past two years; whether the change 
in accountants was approved by the audit committee or the board of 
directors; and whether in connection with the audits of the two 
most recent fiscal years (plus any subsequent interim period) there 
were any "reportable events" or disagreements concerning 
accounting, auditing, or financial disclosure issues, which, if not 
resolved, would have caused the auditor to refer to the issue in 
connection with its report.
The registrant currently is required to provide the accountant 
with a copy of the Form 8-K no later than the day the Form 8-K is 
filed with the Commission, along with a request to provide the 
registrant with a letter (addressed to the Commission) that the 
registrant must file as an exhibit to that Form 8-K.73/ In that 
letter, the accountant should state whether he or she agrees with 
the registrant's disclosure and, if not, the respects in which he 
or she does not agree. As noted above, under the 1988 amendments 
to the item 304(a), certain issues discussed with the new 
accountant also must be disclosed. When this occurs, the new 
accountant is provided the opportunity to review these disclosures 
and submit to the registrant a letter (addressed to the Commission 
and to be filed as an exhibit to the Form 8-K) clarifying the 
registrant's expression of the accountant's views, providing new 
information, or stating the respects in which the accountant 
disagrees with the registrant's disclosure.74/
72/ In FRR 34 (March 2, 1989), the Commission accelerated the 
timing for filing Forms 8-K related to changes in registrants' 
independent accountants to five business days from 15 calendar 
days.
7 3 /  Under item 304(a) (3) of Regulation S-K (and Regulation S-B), 
if the accountant's letter is unavailable at the time the Form 
8-K is filed, the registrant must request that the accountant 
provide the letter as soon as possible, so that the registrant 
may file the letter with the Commission within ten business 
days after the registrant files the Form 8-K with the 
Commission. Notwithstanding this ten business day period, the 
registrant must file the accountant's letter with the 
Commission within two business days of receipt. See FRR 34, 
supra, in which the Commission reduced the relevant time 
period from 30 calendar days to ten business days.
74/ Item 304(a)(2)(D) of Regulation S-K (and Regulation S-B).
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A disagreement with the former accountant reported under Item 
304(a) raises a "red flag" for shareholders, investors, and the 
Commission staff 75/ that the accounting, auditing, or disclosure 
issue was of such importance that, had it not been resolved to the 
accountant's satisfaction, it would have been mentioned in 
connection with the auditor's report. It also triggers both 
additional disclosures pursuant to Item 304(b) of Regulation S-K 76/ 
and disclosure of any discussions with the newly engaged 
accountants that occurred prior to their engagement and concerned 
the subject of the disagreement.77/
Subsequent to the Commission's 1989 revisions to accelerate 
the timing requirements for filing Forms 8-K regarding changes in 
registrants' certifying accountants.78/ the SEC Practice Section 
("SECPS") of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants' ("AICPA") Division for CPA Firms, with the 
encouragement of the Commission, adopted a membership requirement 
for its members to send a letter to the Commission's Office of the
75/ The Division of Corporation Finance commences a full review 
of all incoming Forms 8-K indicating a change of auditor no 
later than the first day following the date they are received 
by the Division's branches. This review may result in a 
referral to the Division of Enforcement, examination of the 
current or next financial statements on a high priority basis, 
or disposition according to the routine comment process. The 
Division of Enforcement also conducts a general review of 
Forms 8-K indicating a change of auditor and makes appropriate 
inquiries when it receives referrals on these matters from the 
Division of Corporation Finance.
76/ 17 CFR 229.304(b). This disclosure includes the former
accountant's opinion as to what the accounting for a 
particular transaction or event should have been, if it 
differs from the accounting being followed for that 
transaction by the registrant.
77/ Disclosure also is required of communications with the newly 
engaged accountant if those communications were subject to 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 50, "Reports on the 
Application of Accounting Principles" (July 1986). This 
statement establishes performance and reporting standards to 
be used when accountants provide written reports (or oral 
advice in certain circumstances) to non-audit clients on the 
application of generally accepted accounting principles or the 
type of opinion that may be rendered on a specific entity's 
financial statements. See, FRR 31, supra.
78/ FRR 34, supra.
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Chief Accountant when a change in accountants occurs.79/ This 
membership requirement became effective May 1, 1989. The SECPS 
letter is intended to alert the Commission staff that the SEC Form 
8-K system for reporting a change in accountants has been 
triggered.80/
Management Advisory Services.
As noted previously, accounting firms have provided management 
advisory services ("MAS" or "non-audit services") 81/ to audit 
clients for decades, predating the enactment of the Federal 
securities laws. Revenues from these services are a significant 
part of the major accounting firms' revenues.82/
Whether the performance of MAS by auditors has an impact on 
auditor independence is a legitimate concern. Because of this 
concern, the Commission, in 1978, adopted a proxy disclosure
7 9 / On January 9, 1990, the AICPA announced that its membership 
had voted to make SECPS membership mandatory for its members 
with SEC audit clients. Under the new provision, if a firm 
with an SEC audit client does not join the SECPS, the firm's 
partners will be expelled from the AICPA. According to the 
SECPS Annual Report for the year ended June 30, 1992, there 
are 1,203 SECPS member firms, 789 of whom are auditors to 
14,643 SEC registrants. SEC Practice Section, Public 
Oversight Board, Combined Annual Report; Year Ended June 30, 
1992. at 18 and 26. The remaining 414 SECPS member firms do 
not have SEC audit clients. Id. The SEC staff has estimated 
that approximately 300 small accounting firms practicing 
before the Commission (auditors to an estimated 500 public 
companies) currently are not SECPS members.
80/ For a discussion of legislative initiatives that would apply 
to changes in accountants, see the discussion of H.R. 574 in 
Re cen t ___Enforcement of the Commission's___Independence
Requirements , supra.
81/ The work of accounting firms generally is broken down for 
statistical purposes into three categories: accounting and 
auditing, tax, and MAS.
82/ Five of the six largest accounting firms derive from 20 to 28 
percent of their total U.S. net revenues from the provision 
of MAS. Over 44 percent of the remaining firm's U.S. revenues 
come from MAS. Public Accounting Report, at 1 (M a r c h  3 1 ,  
1993). Approximately 20 to 27 percent of the six firms' U.S. 
revenues are provided by tax services, with the remainder 
coming from accounting and auditing services. Id.
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requirement related to such services.83/ This disclosure described 
each non-audit service provided by the auditor. It also included 
a statement of the percentage of the fees for all non-audit 
services to total audit fees, the percentage of the fee for each 
non-audit service to total audit fees, and a statement whether each 
non-audit service was considered and approved by the audit 
committee of the board of directors or by the board. Further, the 
Commission published an interpretive release 84/ describing certain 
factors that independent accountants, audit committees, boards of 
directors, and managements should consider in determining whether 
the independent accountants should be engaged to perform non-audit 
services. These factors included the auditor's dependence on MAS 
fees, the possibility of auditors supplanting management's role in 
making corporate decisions, the possibility of creating a situation 
where an auditor may be required to review his or her own work, and 
the relation of the MAS activity to accounting and auditing skills. 
The interpretive release also recognized, however, the potential 
economic benefits to the corporation, and the potential increased 
audit quality, that may result from the auditor's gaining a greater 
understanding of the corporation's business through the performance 
of MAS.
The reaction to the Commission disclosure requirement and 
interpretive release was unexpectedly severe. The interpretive 
release contained a request for comments on the factors set forth 
in the release and on the experience of the profession and the 
corporate community in applying them to concrete fact patterns. 
Accounting firms responded to the request for comments by 
indicating that the disclosure requirement and interpretive release 
had resulted in an unwarranted curtailment of non-audit services. 
They stated that (1) the Commission appeared to be deprecating the 
benefits that may inure to corporations by having MAS performed by
83/ ASR 250 (June 29, 1978). Prior to the implementation of this 
disclosure requirement, a private commission established by 
the AICPA (The Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities, also 
known as the "Cohen Commission") reviewed the performance of 
MAS by auditors. The Cohen Commission found that outside of 
executive search and placement services there was no evidence 
that the performance of MAS compromised auditor independence. 
In spite of this finding, the Cohen Commission urged the 
accounting profession to take steps to diminish the concerns 
of a "significant minority” and recommended that the 
performance of non-audit services be evaluated by audit 
committees or boards of directors, and that registrants or 
auditors appropriately disclose such services. The Commission
on Auditors' R esponsibilities:  Report, Conclusions, and
Recommendations. 100-104 (a research study prepared for the 
AICPA, 1978).
84/ ASR 264 (June 14, 1979).
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their independent accountants.85/ (2) it appeared that the 
Commission might question the independence of an auditor based 
solely on the percentage relationships between audit and non-audit 
services disclosed in the proxy statements, and (3) there was 
confusion as to whether the Commission was concerned with all non­
audit services (including tax services) or only MAS. It also was 
revealed that some registrants apparently had set arbitrary maximum 
percentage fee limits on the amount of non-audit services that 
could be provided by their independent accountants. These 
companies reportedly were deciding whether to engage their auditors 
for MAS activities based on these maximum fee limits, and were not 
considering the more important issues regarding the nature of the 
proposed services and their possible impact on the accountant's 
independence.
Mindful of these reactions to the disclosure rule and 
interpretive release, the Commission studied the 1979, 1980, and 
1981 proxy disclosures. Approximately 1,200 proxy statements were 
reviewed. Of those reviewed, approximately 91 percent in 1979 and 
92 percent in 1980 disclosed that the independent accountants had 
been engaged for some type of non-audit service, with the most 
frequently disclosed services being in tax related areas.86/ Few 
of the registrants reported that their independent accountants had 
performed the services the Commission had mentioned as being 
particularly sensitive, such as consumer surveys, plant layout, and 
actuarial services. The Commission also reviewed the magnitude of 
fees for non-audit services in relation to audit fees, and found 
the following:
Percentage relationships of
fees for non-audit services Percentage of companies 
______ to audit fees_________ ______ in the sample_____
1979 1980
0 - 25% 68% 74%
26 - 50% 22% 15%
51 - 100% 7% 8%
Over 100% 3% 3%
Proxy disclosures in this sample also revealed that the percentage 
of companies having audit committees increased from 81.7 percent 
in 1979, to 84 percent in 1980, and 86.4 percent in 1981. The 
survey further revealed that in 1980, 50.7 percent of the audit 
committees approved each MAS service. In 1981, this percentage 
rose to 53.9. In 1980, 84.9 percent of all companies had no
85/ In ASR 264, supra, however, the Commission specifically 
recognized such benefits.
86/ As noted elsewhere, however, the provision of tax services 
generally is considered to be a separate category of service, 
apart from MAS.
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employee directors serving on audit committees. This percentage 
rose to 86.9 in 1981.
In addition to reviewing the required proxy disclosures, the 
Commission monitored the efforts taken by others in this area. For 
example, the Commission noted that the SECPS required its members 
to report total MAS fees to the audit committee or board of 
directors of each SEC audit client, and to describe the types of 
services rendered. The SECPS and the Public Oversight Board 
("POB") 87/ also indicated that they would monitor MAS through the 
profession's peer review program and "comment ... if the magnitude 
of [MAS] appears to increase to an extent that it threatens 
professional image generally."88/ Finally, the Commission 
recognized that summarized information, similar to what is 
presented in the table on page 32, regarding the relationship 
between MAS and audit fees was provided to the SECPS by member 
firms and was publicly available.
Although the Commission's concerns regarding the provision of 
MAS remained unchanged, based on, among other things: (1) the 
unexpected reaction to the proxy disclosure requirement and the 
Commission's interpretive release and the arbitrary limitation of 
non-audit services being performed by auditors based on the amounts 
of fees for such services rather than the nature of the services 
rendered, (2) the proxy survey that indicated (i) audit committees 
consisting principally of non-employee directors actively were 
reviewing MAS activities and (ii) auditors generally were not 
performing those services believed to have an impact on their 
independence, and (3) the actions taken by the private sector to 
monitor MAS and make information regarding those services publicly 
available, the Commission determined to rescind the formal
87/ Because the peer review process for public companies is 
performed and administered by the accounting profession, the 
AICPA, when it was developing the peer review program in 1977, 
determined that public confidence in the process would be 
increased if an independent board composed of prominent 
individuals oversaw and reported on the peer review program. 
The POB was created to serve this purpose. Today, the POB 
also reports on other matters bearing on the integrity of the 
audit process. The POB, whose activities are funded by the 
AICPA, maintains its independence from the AICPA by selecting 
its members and staff, setting their compensation, and 
choosing the POB Chairman. The current Chairman of the five 
member board is A.A. Sommer, a former SEC Commissioner.
88/ 1979-1980 Annual Report of the Public Oversight Board, at 22.
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interpretive release 89/ and the MAS proxy disclosure 
requirement.90/
89/ In withdrawing the interpretive release, the Commission 
reaffirmed its views regarding the need for caution in the 
provision of MAS. The Commission stated, in part:
Although the Commission's views expressed in [the 
interpretive release] are unchanged and registrants and 
accountants must continue to carefully evaluate their 
relationships to ensure that the public maintains 
confidence in the integrity of financial reporting, the 
Commission is withdrawing that release because it may 
confuse independent accountants, audit committees and 
others who are trying to evaluate services performed or 
to be performed by the accountants. Moreover, the 
Commission believes it has achieved its objective in 
issuing [the interpretive release]. Accountants and 
their self-regulatory structure, audit committees, boards 
of directors and managements are aware of the 
Commission's views on accountants' independence and 
should be sensitive to the possible impact on 
independence of nonaudit services performed by 
accountants. The Commission believes it should be able 
to rely on these persons to ensure adequate consideration 
of the impact on accountants' independence of nonaudit 
services because they share the responsibility to assure 
the public maintains confidence in the independence of 
accountants.
ASR 296, supra.
90/ Id.; ASR 297 (August 20, 1981); and ASR 304 (January 28, 
1982). Approximately two-thirds of the 140 commentators 
expressed support for the rescission of the MAS proxy 
disclosure requirement. The commentators suggesting that 
rescission was not appropriate made two basic arguments. The 
first argument was that accounting firms providing computer 
or actuarial services to their audit clients would not be 
independent because they would audit the systems they design, 
develop, and implement. The second argument was that 
rescission would provide accounting firms with an unfair 
competitive advantage that would threaten the existence of 
computer and actuarial service companies. The second argument 
was rejected by the Commission because it felt that the 
retention of a disclosure requirement simply to affect 
competition in the consulting industry would be considered an 
inappropriate use of the Commission's statutory authority. 
The first argument was reviewed in light of the information 
discussed above and the absence of evidence that (1) investors
(continued...)
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The public accounting firms that are members of the SECPS 
continue to provide the summarized information concerning the level 
of MAS activities. The SECPS also has adopted certain restrictions 
regarding types of MAS services that would impair an auditor's 
independence, if provided to an audit client. In this regard, 
SECPS membership requirements currently prohibit firms from 
performing services for their audit clients such as psychological 
testing, public opinion polls, merger and acquisition assistance 
for a finder's fee, executive recruitment services, and certain 
actuarial services to insurance companies.91/ These membership 
requirements also provide for member firms to report annually, 
among other things, the number of audit clients for which MAS is 
performed within various percentage ranges.92/ Information 
included in the SECPS/POB Combined Annual Report for the Year Ended 
June 30, 199293/ indicates the following levels of MAS services: 
Percentage Relationships of
fees for non-audit services Percentage of companies






When these percentage relationships are compared with those 
derived in 1979 and 1980, as set forth above, it appears that the 
percentage of SEC audit clients receiving significant MAS services 
may have fallen. For example, in 1980, fees from non-audit 
services were from 0 to 25% of the audit fee for 74% of the 
surveyed companies. According to the 1992 POB report, 96.1% (80.2% 
+ 15.9%) of the SEC registrants whose financial statements are 
audited by SECPS members would fall into this category.
90/(...continued)
wanted or used the disclosed information and (2) performance 
of MAS impaired auditors' independence. After full 
consideration, the Commission rescinded the proxy disclosure 
requirement. Id.
9 1/ Organizational Structure and Functions of the SEC Practice 
Section of the AICPA Division for Firms, Section IV.
92 / Id .
93/ SEC Practice Section, Public Oversight Board, Combined Annual 
Report, Year Ended June 30, 1992, at 18.
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The staff also monitors the level of MAS activity provided to 
audit clients through other means. For example, Accounting Today 
annually publishes information on the "Top 60” accounting firms.94/ 
This information indicates that the level of MAS fees for the six 
largest accounting firms, measured as a percentage of the overall 
fees received by each firm, from 1991 to 1993 is as follows:
Firm 1991 1993
Arthur Andersen 44% 46%
Ernst & Young 23 26
Deloitte & Touche 18 23
KPMG Peat Marwick 20 15
Coopers & Lybrand 25 25
Price Waterhouse 28 30
The 1993 Accounting Today "Top 60" report also indicates that 
from 1992 to 1993 the percentage of aggregate fees attributable to 
MAS work to total revenues for both the six largest accounting 
firms and the top 60 firms remained steady at 28.9%. By way of 
comparison, this report indicates that in 1989 MAS fees for the top 
60 firms were 24.1%, and for the top six firms they were 25.4%, of 
total fees received.95/
The percentages reflected in the "Top 60" report include fees 
for MAS, and total revenues for services, provided to both SEC 
audit clients and all other parties. Combining the statistics in 
the POB report with those in the Top 60 report may indicate that, 
although over time there has been an increase in MAS services, much 
of that increase may be for parties other than SEC audit clients.
Today, the SEC staff generally does not object to the 
provision of MAS to audit clients provided the services do not 
result in the accounting firm's auditing its own work, making 
decisions for management of the client, or recovering client 
assets, for example collecting past-due accounts receivable. For 
example, the staff has raised independence issues where the auditor 
performed certain valuation services and feasibility studies, or 
prepared financial forecasts, or functioned in a management 
capacity. In these cases, the client presumably would rely on the 
auditor's work to make business decisions and the auditor would 
have to review the outcome of those decisions as part of the audit.
The nature of MAS provided by accountants continues to change 
and expand. Large-scale information systems implementation and 
integration and litigation support engagements are becoming more
94/ Accounting Today. "The Sixth Annual Top 60; 1993," (a
supplement to the December 13, 1993 edition).
95/ I d .
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common. Although it appears that the significant majority of these 
services are performed for parties other than SEC audit clients, 
the staff is mindful of the potential impact of MAS on auditors' 
independence, in light of the increasing role of non-audit 
personnel (who are not bound by the accounting profession's Code 
of Ethics) at the top management levels of the firms, the need for 
capital to finance growth in areas such as computer system 
installation services, and the increasing possibility of firms 
offering services that are incompatible with the audit function. 
The staff will continue to be alert to the development of problems 
of independence that may be caused by MAS. The lack of an 
apparent, dramatic increase in MAS provided to SEC audit clients, 
however, suggests that a fundamental change in the Commission's 
regulations is not necessary at this time.
Client Advocacy.
In addition to the numerous independence issues that surround 
the conduct of an audit, the SEC staff is concerned that certain 
accounting firms may have compromised their objectivity with 
respect to proposed or actual client accounting treatments with the 
SEC staff. The Commission staff wishes to stress that the number 
of instances in which questionable client advocacy has been 
established is very small in relation to the number of audited 
financial statements filed with the Commission. The staff 
continues to believe that the vast majority of audits are conducted 
in an appropriately skeptical manner. The staff also appreciates 
that reasonable people may come to different conclusions on 
accounting issues and, in good faith, hold and represent views that 
differ from those of the staff. The OCA encourages registrants and 
their auditors to discuss and resolve financial accounting and 
reporting issues with the staff. A different situation arises, 
however, when high levels of authority within major accounting 
firms appear to argue unfounded positions before the staff.96/ 
Some of these instances cause the staff to question the appearance 
of auditor independence.
The staff believes that these events raise questions about 
whether the auditor has maintained an appropriate relationship to 
his or her audit client. The staff recognizes, however, that the 
problem of an appearance of "client advocacy” may not be 
susceptible to correction through additional, objective 
independence interpretations or rules. The current sanction for 
this type of conduct is a possible reduction in credibility before 
the public on the accounting issue being considered. This is a 
serious sanction, indeed. To prevent such a loss of confidence in 
a firm's views, the firm, when accompanying audit clients to
96/  See generally, address by Chief Accountant Walter P. Schuetze, 
AICPA Twenty-first Annual National Conference on Current SEC 
Developments (January 11, 1994).
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meetings with the Commission staff or providing written 
substantiation for the proposed accounting, should present 
positions that are well-founded in, or logical extensions of, 
authoritative accounting literature.97/
As in all areas of independence, the auditor should remember 
that his or her duty to the public overrides any responsibility 
owed to the audit client. The first definition of "client" in 
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary is "a person under the 
protection of another.” Clearly, the investing public looks to the 
auditor for comfort regarding the reliability of registrants' 
financial statements 98/ and the public, not the company paying 
the firm's fee, must be the true "client" of the firm. 
Accordingly, any "advocacy” by the firm should be in support of 
positions that are intended to benefit and protect investors and 
the public.
III. SEC RULES AND INTERPRETATIONS
Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X
As previously noted, the Federal Trade Commission, prior to 
the formation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, adopted 
the first rule implementing the statutory requirement that auditors 
must be independent of registrants that file audited financial 
statements pursuant to the Federal securities laws.99/ This rule
97/ The staff recognizes that the complexity of some accounting 
standards and, in some instances, the lack of concise, 
workable definitions of accounting terms may contribute to 
this problem. The staff has encouraged standards-setters, to 
the extent practicable, to adopt simple, bright-line 
accounting principles and auditing standards. See, e.g., 
Testimony of William R. McLucas, Director, Division of 
Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Before 
the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Concerning Private 
Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws, at 10 n.15 (June 
17, 1993).
98/ See/ United States v. Arthur Young, supra.
99/ See Background in part I of this study for a discussion of 
the evolution of the Commission's independence requirements. 
The Federal Trade Commission rule stated, in part:
The Commission will not recognize any such certified 
accountant or public accountant as independent if such 
accountant is not in fact independent. Unless the 
Commission otherwise directs, such accountant will not
(continued__)
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initially was incorporated into the SEC's registration forms and 
in February 1940, when the Commission centralized many of its 
accounting requirements in one regulation, into Rule 2-01 of 
Regulation S-X.100/ As then adopted, Rule 2-01, entitled 
"Qualifications of Accountants,” stated that the Commission would 
not recognize any accountant as a certified public accountant or 
as a public accountant who was not duly registered, in good 
standing, and entitled to practice in the place of the accountant's 
residence or principal office. The rule also stated that the 
Commission would not recognize any accountant as independent who 
was not in fact independent, and then set forth situations where 
an accountant would "not be considered" independent. These 
situations included those where the accountant had any direct or 
indirect substantial interest in the registrant or was connected 
with the registrant as a promoter, underwriter, voting trustee, 
director, officer, or employee.101/
Over the years, Rule 2-01 has been amended on several 
occasions. For example, in 1942 the rule was revised to make it 
clear that, in determining whether "certifying accountants" are 
independent as to a particular registrant, there should be taken 
into account not only the work done in auditing the financial 
statements but also other work done for the registrant. 102/ In 
1958 the Commission amended the rule to recognize that in some 
instances, such as relationships between the auditor or his or her 
family and "remote affiliates” of the registrant, "some latitude 
for judgement is necessary” in evaluating the accountant's 
independence. The rule, therefore, was revised "to permit a test 
of materiality to these borderline areas."103/ Finally, the rule
99/(...continued)
be considered independent with respect to any person in 
whom he has any interest, directly or indirectly, or with 
whom he is connected as an officer, agent, employee, 
promoter, underwriter, trustee, partner, director, or 
person performing similar function.
Federal Trade Commission, Rules and Regulations Under t he 
Securities Act of 1933. Article 14, "Accountants" (July 6, 
1933).
100/ 17 CFR §210.2-01. See, Accounting Series Release No. ("ASR") 
12 (February 21, 1940).
101/Id.
102/ ASR 37 (November 7, 1942).
103/ ASR 79 (April 8, 1958).
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was amended in 1972, and again in 1983, to clarify which "members" 
of the accounting firm must meet the independence criteria. 104/
Current Rule 2-01 states as follows:
(a) The Commission will not recognize any person as a 
certified public accountant who is not duly registered and in 
good standing as such under the laws of the place of his 
residence or principal office. The Commission will not 
recognize any person as a public accountant who is not in good 
standing and entitled to practice as such under the laws of 
the place of his residence or principal office.
(b) The Commission will not recognize any certified public 
accountant or public accountant as independent who is not in 
fact independent. For example, an accountant will be 
considered not independent with respect to any person or any 
of its parents, its subsidiaries, or other affiliates (1) in 
which, during the period of his professional engagement to 
examine the financial statements being reported on or at the 
date of his report, he, his firm, or a member of his firm had, 
or was committed to acquire, any direct financial interest or 
any material indirect financial interest; (2) with which, 
during the period of his professional engagement to examine 
the financial statements being reported on, at the date of his 
report or during the period covered by the financial 
statements, he, his firm, or a member of his firm was 
connected as a promoter, underwriter, voting trustee, 
director, officer, or employee. A  firm's independence will 
not be deemed to be affected adversely where a former officer 
or employee of a particular person is employed by or becomes 
a partner, shareholder or other principal in the firm and such 
individual has completely disassociated himself from the 
person and its affiliates and does not participate in auditing 
financial statements of the person or its affiliates covering 
any period of his employment by the person. For the purposes 
of §2.10.2-01(b), the term "member" means (i) all partners, 
shareholders, and other principals in the firm, (ii) any 
professional employee involved in providing any professional 
service to the person, its parents, subsidiaries, or other 
affiliates, and (iii) any professional employee having 
managerial responsibilities and located in the engagement 
office or other office of the firm which participates in a 
significant portion of the audit.
(c) In determining whether an accountant may in fact be not 
independent with respect to a particular person, the 
Commission will give appropriate consideration to all relevant
104/ ASR 125 (June 23, 1972) and Financial Reporting Release No. 
("FRR") 10 (February 25, 1983).
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circumstances, including evidence bearing on all relationships 
between the accountant and that person or any affiliate 
thereof, and will not confine itself to the relationships 
existing in connection with the filing of reports with the 
Commission.
Interpretations
Rule 2*01 does not contain comprehensive guidance for 
determining whether accountants are independent because, as stated 
in subparagraph (c) of the rule, such a determination must be made 
in view of all the circumstances of a particular case. Since its 
inception, the Commission and its staff have been called upon to 
make such determinations and periodically the Commission has 
published its opinions to apprise the public of its views.105/
In 1982, the Commission conducted a complete review of its 
accounting and auditing releases, including those concerning 
auditor independence issues. This review led to the publication 
by the Commission of the "Codification of Financial Reporting 
Policies" ("CFRP" or the "Codification").106/ The Codification 
provided in one document, organized in a logical manner, 
information officially published by the Commission since 1934 that 
continued to be relevant to preparers, users, and auditors of 
registrants' financial statements. Section 600 of the Codification 
is entitled "Matters Relating to Independent Accountants" and 
contains statements by the Commission related to the role of 
independence in the auditing process, Commission requirements and 
interpretations relating to independence, disclosures about 
independent accountants, the relation of the performance of non* 
audit services to auditor independence, accountants' liability for 
reports on unaudited interim financial information under the 1933 
Act, and certain certification requirements. Since 1982, whenever 
the Commission has issued a release addressing an auditor 
independence issue, section 600 of the Codification has been 
amended to include, in the appropriate subsection, relevant
105/ See, e.g., ASRs 2 (1937), 22 (1941), 37 (1942), 47 (1944), 81 
(1958), 112 (1968), 126 (1972), 234 (1977), and 291 (1981). 
See part I of this study for a description of the Commission's 
opinions.
106/ FRR 1 (April 15, 1982). This release also announced that the 
Commission would no longer publish ASRs. Instead, the 
Commission would publish one series of releases regarding 
accounting and auditing enforcement cases, called "Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Releases" or "AAERs," and another 
series containing other information regarding accounting and 
auditing matters related to financial reporting issues, 
entitled "Financial Reporting Releases" or "FRRs."
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excerpts from the release.107/ Today, Codification section 600 
provides extensive interpretations, guidelines, and examples for 
registrants and auditors to use in evaluating independence issues.
In addition, the Commission staff responds to numerous oral 
and written requests for informal advice on the application of the 
Commission's independence requirements.108/ During fiscal year 
1993, the staff issued eleven interpretive letters following full 
consideration of the requestors' written submissions and, in many 
instances, meetings with the requestors and their representatives. 
The staff also responded to over one hundred phone calls regarding 
independence issues. Written responses to requests for such advice 
are placed in a  file that is available in the Commission's public 
reference room.109/ Many of these letters also are reproduced by 
private publishers of financial information.
Recent issues addressed by the staff include whether an 
accounting firm's independence is impaired when (1) an independent 
auditor of an Argentinean company acts as that company's statutory 
auditor,110/ (2) the Chief Financial Officer of an audit client in 
New York City is the brother of a partner in the accounting firm's 
Boston office, or (3) an accounting firm acquires a French law firm 
that provides legal representation to the accounting firm's audit 
clients.
107/ For example, when the Commission in 1988 and 1989 expanded 
and accelerated the disclosure requirements regarding changes 
in registrants' independent accountants, relevant portions of 
the adopting releases were inserted at sections 603.02.d and 
603.06-08.a. of the Codification. These requirements are 
discussed in part I of this study.
108/ Unless republished in a Commission release, staff responses 
do not bind the Commission. The staff responses usually are 
in the form of a representation that the staff of the Office 
of the Chief Accountant either considers the auditor's 
independence to be impaired or will not raise a question 
regarding the auditor's independence based on the facts, 
circumstances, and representations made to the staff in that 
particular case. If the person requesting the staff's advice 
disagrees with the staff's position, that person may ask the 
staff to seek an informal statement of the Commission's views. 
Granting the request for such a statement, however, is 
entirely within the Commission's discretion. 17 CFR 202.1(d).
109/ See FRR 33 (November 25, 1988) and FRR 4 (October 14, 1982).
110/ Letter from John M. Riley, Deputy Chief Accountant, to Mr. 
Richard Dieter (April 8, 1993) (indicating that independence 
would be deemed to be impaired).
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Further information regarding the Commission's disclosure, 
interpretive, and enforcement efforts to enhance auditors' 
independence is set forth in part II of this study. Disclosure 
requirements discussed in that section include information 
regarding audit committees of boards of directors, and changes of 
independent auditors. Interpretive releases set forth decisions 
made by the Commission and the staff in specific situations, and 
expand upon the Commission's requirement for "scrupulous 
adherence "111/ to the fact and appearance of auditor independence. 
Finally, enforcement cases discussed in part II display the 
Commission's willingness to take appropriate action when auditors 
fail to fulfill the independence requirements.
In addition, particular aspects of the Commission's 
independence rule and interpretations are discussed in detail in 
Appendix II to this study, which contains a comparison of SEC, 
AICPA, and other nations' independence requirements.
IV. PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
("AICPA") 112/ promotes the concept of auditor independence. The 
AICPA's auditing standards, adopted by its Auditing Standards Board 
("ASB "),113/ and the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (the 
"Code"), as interpreted by the AICPA's Ethics Division, firmly 
establish auditor independence as one of the organization's 
fundamental principles.
The accounting profession, however, was relatively slow to 
establish specific requirements that define independent 
conduct.114/ For example, although a resolution to prohibit 
auditors from acting as officers or directors of audit clients was
111/ ASR 296 (August 20, 1981).
112/ The AICPA is the largest national professional institute of 
Certified Public Accountants ("CPAs”) with over 310,000 
members in public practice, industry, and academia.
 
113/ A resolution of the AICPA Council designates the ASB as the 
body empowered to promulgate auditing and attest standards 
and procedures. See Rule 202 of the Code of Professional 
Conduct, ET §202.01, and Appendix A to the Code. The ASB's 
15 members are partners in large, medium, and small accounting 
firms and an academic. Each serves on the ASB on a part-time 
basis. The eight ASB staff are employees of the AICPA, and 
funding for the ASB is provided by the AICPA.
114/ See part II of this study for the historical development of 
United States independence standards.
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first introduced at an annual meeting of the American Institute of 
Accountants (the predecessor to the AICPA) in 1931 115/ a final 
rule prohibiting such relationships was not adopted by the AICPA 
until 1961, 1 1 6 / well after the enactment of the Federal securities 
laws and the Commission's imposition of such a requirement in Rule 
2-01 of Regulation S-X. In addition, the profession's adoption in 
1941 of a rule prohibiting auditors from owning securities issued 
by their publicly held audit clients simply echoed the Commission's 
Rule 2-01.117/ And it was not until 1947 (14 years after enactment 
of the independence requirement in the Federal securities laws) 
that the Executive Committee of the AICPA issued a "tentative 
statement” on accountants' independence, which was intended to 
provide guidance to the profession, the public, and others.118/ 
This statement read, in part:
A most important function which the certified public 
accountant performs in our economic life today is the part he 
plays in the maintenance of mutual confidence which is 
necessary in business relationships and transactions. The 
relationship may be that between management and stockholders, 
especially in publicly-held corporations.... It has become 
of great value to those who rely on financial statements of 
business enterprises that they be reviewed by persons skilled 
in accounting whose judgment is uncolored by any interest in 
the enterprise, and upon whom the obligation has been imposed 
to disclose material facts. With the growth of business 
enterprises, the public accountant makes a vital contribution 
in meeting the need for independent, impartial, and expert 
opinions on the financial position and results of 
operations.119/
Today, the AICPA maintains its independence requirements apart 
from those of the Commission. In many areas, the Commission, 
rather than adopting a position similar to an AICPA requirement, 
simply refers registrants and their auditors to the AICPA 
requirement as an appropriate interpretation of the Commission's 
auditor independence rules. In other areas, the Commission's 
interpretive guidance is more expansive or more explicit than the 
AICPA's requirements, resulting in certain inconsistencies between
115/ L. Rappaport, SEC Accounting Practice and Procedure. 26.2- 
26.3 (The Ronald Press Company, 3d ed. 1972).
116/ D. Causey, Duties and Liabilities of Public Accountants, 26 
(Dow Jones-Irwin, rev. ed. 1982).
117/ Id.
118/ Rappaport, supra, at 26.6-26.7.
119/ Id. quoting 84 The Journal of Accountancy 51 (1947).
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the two sets of regulations. These differences may be, in part, 
because the Commission's views are more relevant to larger issuers 
who are seeking capital in the public markets, while the AICPA's 
rules apply to auditors of the financial statements of smaller, 
private companies as well as those of public companies.
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards
As noted above, generally accepted auditing standards ("GAAS") 120/ 
require that auditors be independent. General Standard No. 2 
states, "In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence 
in mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or 
auditors. " 1 2 1 /  Interpretations of GAAS, issued as Statements on 
Auditing Standards by the ASB, further emphasize the importance of 
the concept of auditor independence. Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. ("SAS”) 1, states:
It is of utmost importance to the profession that the general 
public maintain confidence in the independence of independent 
auditors. Public confidence would be impaired by evidence 
that independence was actually lacking, and it might also be 
impaired by the existence of circumstances which reasonable 
people might believe likely to influence independence. To be 
independent, the auditor must be intellectually honest; to be 
recognized as independent, he must be free from any obligation 
or interest in the client, its management, or its owners---
120/ In February 1941, the Commission amended Rule 2-02 of 
Regulation S-X, 17 CFR §210.2-02, to require that the auditor 
state in his or her report "whether the audit was made in 
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards 
applicable in the circumstances.” Accounting Series Release 
No. ("ASR") 21 (February 5, 1941). In this release, the
Commission defined "generally accepted auditing standards" to 
mean the application of "generally recognized normal auditing 
procedures" with professional competence by properly trained 
persons. The Commission defined "generally recognized normal 
auditing procedures" to be those normally employed by skilled 
accountants and those prescribed by authoritative bodies 
dealing with the subject of auditing, such as the various 
accounting societies and governmental bodies having 
jurisdiction in the area. Id. Following this addition to the 
Commission's rules, the relevant professional committee at the 
time, the Committee on Auditing Procedure, began a study to 
determine which auditing standards should be included within 
"GAAS." In 1948, the membership of the AICPA's predecessor 
organization approved ten standards as constituting GAAS, 
including three general standards, three standards of field 
work, and four standards of reporting. See AU §150.02.
121/ AU §150.02.
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Independent auditors should not only be independent in fact; 
they should avoid situations that may lead outsiders to doubt 
their independence [italics in original].122/
Code of Professional Conduct
In practice, however, the regulations and interpretations 
promulgated pursuant to the Code, rather than the auditing 
standards, embody the AICPA's specific independence requirements 
and regulations. These regulations unconditionally support the 
concept of auditor independence by stating, in part:
The public expects a number of character traits in a certified 
public accountant but primarily integrity and objectivity and, 
in the practice of public accounting, independence.
Independence has always been a concept fundamental to the 
accounting profession, the cornerstone of its philosophical 
structure. For no matter how competent any [Certified Public 
Accountant] may be, his opinion on financial statements will 
be of little value to those who rely on him - whether they be 
clients or any of his unseen audience of credit grantors, 
investors, governmental agencies and the like - unless he 
maintains his independence....
To sum up, CPAs cannot avoid external pressures on their 
integrity and objectivity in the course of their professional 
work, but they are expected to resist these pressures. They 
must, in fact, retain their integrity and objectivity in all 
phases of their practice and, when expressing opinions on 
financial statements, avoid involvement in situations that 
would impair the credibility of their independence in the 
minds of reasonable men familiar with the facts. 123/
The Bylaws of the AICPA require members to conform with the 
Code and provide that members may be disciplined for violations of 
the Code.124/ The AICPA's Professional Ethics Executive Committee 
provides interpretations of the independence requirements in the 
Code, and occasionally issues ethics rulings. Accordingly, the 
Ethics Committee, rather than the ASB, is the generally recognized 
authority within the AICPA in the area of auditor independence.
In addition, individual accounting firms are required by the 
AICPA to have internal procedures that monitor compliance with 
independence standards and rules. The AICPA's Statements on
122/ AU §220.03.
123/ ET §§ 52.01 and 52.19.
124/ AICPA Bylaws, §§ 2.3.2 and 7.4.1, respectively.
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Quality Control Standards provide general guidance that the firms 
use in developing specific policies and procedures. Many firms 
have their partners annually sign statements attesting to the 
absence of any situations that may impair the firm's independence. 
Firms also may distribute new client lists, instructing members of 
the firm to divest any disqualifying interest in those entities, 
and provide various levels of independence training.125/ 
Relationship of SBC and A ICPA Requirements
The Securities and Exchange Commission exercises essentially 
no oversight of the AICPA's Ethics Division. Although the AICPA 
ethics staff and the Commission staff routinely discuss individual 
independence situations on an informal basis. 126/ historically, the 
Ethics Division consistently has not sought Commission input into 
the development of its independence interpretations and rulings 
and, on the occasions when the Commission staff has expressed an 
opinion different from that of the Ethics Division on an issue, 
the AICPA generally has not been receptive to the staff's views. 
Further, as the AICPA's disciplinary proceedings are closed from 
public view, the Commission staff has not been able to form an 
opinion as to the efficacy of the profession's enforcement of its 
independence requirements. In a similar respect, the Commission 
and its staff have been comfortable assessing the facts from the 
viewpoint of a "reasonable investor" and making their own auditor 
independence determinations without formal consultation with the 
profession. This has led to two sets of independence requirements 
that auditors to public companies must follow.127/
The existence of multiple requirements sometimes leads to 
difficulties, particularly in cases when an entity's financial 
statements are required for the first time to be included in a 
filing with the Commission. For example, when a private company 
determines to make a public offering of its securities (or when the
125/ See, R. Kay and D. Searfoss, Handbook of Accounting and 
Auditing. 5-18 (Warren, Gorham and Lamont, 2d ed. 1989).
126/ As noted above, in areas where the AICPA has established an 
independence requirement, and the Commission has not, the 
Commission may look to the AICPA requirement as the 
appropriate guidance.
127/ Not all auditors to Commission registrants, however, are 
members of the AICPA. Although the auditors to the vast 
majority of Commission registrants are firms whose partners 
are members of the AICPA, AICPA membership is not mandatory 
for an accountant to practice before the Commission. The 
financial statements of an estimated 500 public companies 
filing with the Commission are audited by an estimated 300 
firms whose partners are not members of the AICPA.
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company is acquired by a public company), the company may discover 
that the report of its auditor is unacceptable because the auditor 
did not meet Commission independence requirements at the time of 
the audit, even though the auditor was in compliance with the AICPA 
requirements. In such cases, it may be necessary to engage another 
accountant to audit and report on the company's financial 
statements, or, in rare cases where another accountant is unable 
to perform the audit, the company may be unable to complete an 
offering. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that, while many 
of the larger firms have charged specific partners with the 
continuous duty to be aware of both Commission and AICPA 
independence requirements and to assure compliance with those 
requirements, it frequently is difficult for smaller firms to stay 
current as to the AICPA and SEC requirements and the differences 
between the two.
The Commission staff recognizes the merits of minimizing, to 
the extent possible, the differences between the two sets of 
requirements. The staff and representatives of the Ethics 
Committee recently met on a trial basis to discuss differences 
between the Commission's and the AICPA's independence rules and 
interpretations. While no decisions were reached, the staff and 
the division representatives have decided to continue such 
meetings.
Many of the differences between the SEC and AICPA requirements 
may not be resolved easily. For example, the AICPA, in recognition 
of the lack of adequate accounting personnel in many small, 
privately held companies, permits auditors to perform certain 
bookkeeping tasks without negatively affecting the auditors' 
independence. The Commission, however, has taken the view that 
this practice results in auditors auditing their own work, 
destroying the possibility of a critical outside look at companies' 
financial statements, and impairs auditors' independence. This 
issue and further differences between the Commission's and the 
AICPA's independence requirements are explained in detail in 
Appendix II to this study.
V. OTHER NATIONS' INDEPENDENCE REQUIREMENTS
Domestic registrants increasingly conduct international 
businesses with operations in countries that are serviced by local 
offices, or affiliates, of their independent accountants. In 
addition, a record number of foreign registrants have become 
subject to the Commission's registration requirements.128/ The
128/ In 1992, more than $34.6 billion of securities of foreign 
issuers were filed for registration under the Securities Act 
of 1933. These issuers included 87 new foreign companies from 
21 countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Australia,
(continued...)
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Commission generally has required auditors of the financial 
statements of domestic registrants with non-U.S. operations, and 
auditors of the financial statements of non-U.S. registrants, to 
comply with the U.S. auditing and independence requirements when 
their audit reports are to be included in Commission filings.
The first time an audit report of a non-U.S. auditor is to be 
filed with the Commission, the staff may ask the auditor for 
information regarding that auditor's familiarity with U.S. 
generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"), U.S. generally 
accepted auditing standards ("GAAS"), and U.S. independence 
requirements. If the auditor is not sufficiently knowledgeable 
about U.S. standards and requirements, the staff may suggest that 
the registrant or the auditor engage an affiliate of a U.S. 
accounting firm either as a consultant to the non-U.S. auditor or 
to assist directly in the audit.129/
The Commission's insistence on a U.S. GAAS audit and 
compliance with U.S. independence requirements is based on the view 
that U.S. investors are entitled t o  the same level of assurance 
from an audit, irrespective of where it is performed. One of the 
more controversial issues facing the Commission today is the extent 
that the Commission, when making independence determinations, 
should take into account the customs, laws, and culture of the 
nation in which the audit is conducted. The Commission's staff has 
been reluctant to acquiesce to arguments based on representations 
that "this is how it is done in the registrant's home country," 
because the staff has looked at auditor independence issues from 
the point of view of the reasonable investor in the United States 
who will be asked to invest his, her, or its funds in the
128/(...continued)
Brazil, Korea, and Singapore. At the end of 1992, there were 
496 foreign companies from 35 countries filing reports with 
the Commission. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
Fifty-Eighth Annual Report to Congress. 52 (1992).
129/ The staff may send a letter to the registrant or the 
accounting firm asking for information demonstrating the 
firm's independence requirements for its professional 
employees, that the firm is in good standing and 
professionally qualified in the jurisdiction in which the 
report is issued, and that the firm's professional members 
and staff are knowledgeable regarding and have followed in 
this engagement U.S. GAAP, U.S. GAAS, and U.S. independence 
requirements. When a consultant is engaged, the consultant 
may be asked to provide the staff with a letter describing, 
among other things, the foreign auditor's compliance with the 
independence and reporting requirements in Article 2 of 
Regulation S-X, 17 CFR §210.2-01 et seq.
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registrant's securities.130/ This "reasonable investor" is 
entitled under the Federal securities laws to the assurance 
provided by an independent audit.131/ In countries where the level 
of assurance provided by an audit falls below that contemplated 
under U.S. law, the requirement for independently audited financial 
statements may be deemed to have not been met, regardless of 
disclosure of the differing requirements. In addition, comparable 
audits and independence requirements contribute to an "even playing 
field" in the competition for U.S. investors' funds.132/
The Commission, however, has been involved in and supports 
efforts to harmonize international accounting, auditing, and 
independence requirements.133/ The Commission staff is 
participating in the efforts of the International Federation of 
Accountants ("IFAC") 134/ and the International Organization of
130/ This staff study on auditor independence issues should not be 
read as expressing any position of the Commission or the staff 
on the issue of foreign listing requirements on U.S. 
exchanges. This study speaks only to balancing the protection 
of U.S. investors afforded by the U.S. auditor independence 
requirements against the possible denial of investment 
opportunities in securities issued by foreign entities whose 
auditors fail to satisfy those requirements.
131/ See part II of this study regarding "The Need for Auditor 
Independence" and "Background" of the development of the 
independence requirement in this country. As noted in that 
section, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the 
independence requirement is "to obviate the fear of loss from 
reliance on inaccurate information" and, accordingly, it is 
"not enough that financial statements be accurate; the public 
must also perceive them as being accurate." United States v. 
Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 819 n. 15.
132/ Limited exceptions to the U.S. independence requirements have 
been provided in interpretations issued by the Commission 
where foreign law requires that an auditor have a financial 
interest in its audit client, and for certain de minimis or 
immaterial services provided to foreign divisions, 
subsidiaries, or investees of domestic registrants provided 
such services are consistent with the local professional 
ethics rules. See Appendix II to this study.
133/ See, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Policy 
Statement, Regulation of International Securities-Markets. 8- 
10, International Series Release No. 1 (November 1988).
134/ IFAC is an organization of over 100 accounting professional 
organizations representing 78 countries. IFAC has the broad
(continued...)
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Securities Commissions ("IOSCO") 135/ to resolve differences in 
these standards. In 1992, at its XVIIth Annual Conference in 
London, IOSCO adopted a resolution recommending that its member 
nations accept unified auditing standards developed by the 
International Auditing Practices Committee, an IFAC technical 
committee. This resolution, however, notes that, at present, there 
is no consensus on issues regarding auditor qualifications and 
independence, among others, and that these areas therefore are not 
included within the recommendation. IFAC is continuing to work on 
these issues.
Independent of IOSCO, the Commission has adopted a 
multijurisdictional disclosure system ("MJDS") with Canada.136/ 
Prior to the implementation of this system, the Commission studied 
in considerable detail the Canadian independence requirements. The 
Commission ultimately concluded that the Canadian requirements were 
sufficiently close to the U.S. independence requirements that U.S. 
investors could rely, to some extent, on the Canadian standards. 
As a result, under the MJDS, in order to make an initial public 
offering in the United States, Canadian auditors to Canadian 
registrants need to comply with the U.S. independence requirements 
only with respect to the audit of the financial statements of the 
most recent fiscal year prior to the offering. 137/ Once a U.S. 
offering is made, however, the auditor must continue to comply with 
the U.S. independence requirements.138/
134/(...continued)
objective to develop and enhance a coordinated worldwide 
accountancy profession with harmonized standards.
135/ IOSCO is an organization of over 50 national securities 
commissions resolved to ensure better regulation of markets, 
to exchange information, to promote the development of 
domestic markets, to unite in an effective surveillance of 
international securities transactions, and to ensure effective 
enforcement against securities law offenses.
136/ Securities Act Release No. 6902 (June 21, 1991).
137/ As a general rule, all three years of a registrant's financial 
statements included in a Commission filing must be audited by 
an accountant who is in compliance with U.S. independence 
requirements. See Articles 2 and 3 of Regulation S-X, 17 CFR 
§§210.2-01 and 210.3-01 et seq.
138/ See, e.g., General Instruction III. B. to Form F-10, 17 CFR 
§239.40, which states:
The Commission's rules on auditor independence, as 
codified in Section 600 of the Codification of Financial
(continued...)
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The OCA, with the assistance of foreign regulators and 
accounting firms with offices or affiliates outside the United 
States, has reviewed the independence requirements in other 
jurisdictions. The staff's review was intended to identify 
specific differences between nations' requirements and procedures 
by which the requirements are established and enforced. This 
review has indicated that the U.S. independence requirements, as 
implemented by the Commission and the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants. 139/ tend to be more specific and more 
restrictive than those of other nations. Reasons for this 
different level of standards may include that independent audits 
in some nations are conducted by statutory auditors, who are 
directly responsible to shareholders, and that, in certain other
138/ (...continued)
Reporting Policies, apply to auditor reports on all 
financial statements that are included in this 
registration statement, except that such rules do not 
apply with respect to periods prior to the most recent 
fiscal year for which financial statements are included 
in the registration statement .... Notwithstanding the 
exception in the previous sentence, such rules do apply 
with respect to any periods prior to the most recent 
fiscal year if the issuer previously was required to file 
with the Commission a report or registration statement 
containing an auditor report on financial statements for 
such periods as to which the Commission's rules on 
auditor independence applied.
The Commission staff has been willing to work with Canadian 
auditors to address difficulties in meeting the MUDS 
independence requirement in limited areas. For example, when 
Canadian auditors of "Schedule I” Canadian banks, which may 
wish to make offerings in the U.S. under the MJDS, indicated 
that they would not be able to comply with the time table for 
phasing-in revised U.S. independence requirements regarding 
auditors' loans from financial institution audit clients, the 
staff indicated that it would not object to a limited 
extension of the compliance deadline. Letter to Messrs. 
Robert D. Brown, Alan J. Dilworth, and W. Ross Walker from Mr. 
Walter P. Schuetze, Chief Accountant (May 19, 1993).
139/ For a discussion of the auditor independence requirements of 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, see 
part IV and Appendix II of this study.
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nations, the audit may be conducted primarily for a purpose other 
than financial reporting.140/
Many of the specific differences among nations' independence 
requirements are discussed in detail in Appendix II to this study.
VI. RECENT AND CURRENTLY PROPOSED CHANGES
In a manner similar to the SEC staff's continuous re­
examination of its independence rules and interpretations, the 
accounting profession reviews its independence requirements. For 
example, in 1991 the AICPA noted that its Interpretation 101-1, 
which generally prohibited auditors from having any material, 
unsecured loan to or from an audit client, needed to be restated 
in view of alleged abuses of the permissible exceptions stated in 
the rule. This rule prohibited auditors from having any loan to 
or from an audit client except for loans from financial 
institutions that were made under normal lending procedures, terms, 
and requirements and were (1) not material to the borrower's net 
worth, (2) home mortgages, or (3) other secured loans. The AICPA 
amended its rule so that the only loans that an auditor may obtain 
from financial institutions that are audit clients are (1) 
automobile loans and leases collateralized by the vehicle, (2) 
credit card and checking account advances with an aggregate unpaid 
balance of $5,000 or less, (3) loans on the cash surrender value 
of insurance policies, and (4) loans fully collateralized by cash 
deposits (passbook loans). Loans complying with the prior rule, 
however, were "grandfathered" under the new rule.
Others also stand watch on the quality of independence 
requirements. For example, the POB recently issued a special 
report containing, among other things, "Recommendations to 
Strengthen Independence and Professionalism."141/ The POB 
suggests, among other things, 1) that the AICPA "sharpen further 
the distinction between client advocacy and client service and 
incorporate that distinction into the profession's Code of 
Professional Conduct," 2) that "accounting firms take special care 
to ensure their participation in the standards setting process is 
characterized by objectivity and professionalism" rather than 
acting as "hired guns” for their audit clients, and 3) that, to 
prevent audit engagement partners from supporting a client's policy 
on an accounting matter in discussions with the SEC staff when 
"that policy is clearly an unreasonable application of generally
140/ For example, it is the staff's understanding that in Germany 
and Japan an entity's financial statements form the basis for 
annual tax accounts.
141/ POB, In the Public Interest; A Special Report by the Public 
Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section, AICPA, 43 (March 
5, 1993).
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accepted accounting principles," an engagement partner should 
consult on accounting issues with partners at the appropriate level 
in that partner's firm before engaging in discussions with the SEC 
staff.142/
In addition, the AICPA Board of Directors, in its June 1993 
paper entitled Meeting the Financial Reporting Needs of the Future: 
A P u b l i c  Commitment _From the Public Accounting Profession, noted 
steps "to improve the value of financial information and the 
public's confidence in it," 143/ including enhanced measures 
"Assuring Auditor Independence. "144/ The AICPA Board of Directors 
recommendations. include (1) the adoption of rules by the SEC and 
other regulators that would "prohibit public companies and other 
organizations with public accountability from hiring the partner 
responsible for their audit for one year after the partner ceases 
to serve that client,” and (2) the use of mandatory audit 
committees, composed entirely of independent directors whenever 
practical, that are charged with specific responsibilities, 
including overseeing the company's financial reporting process and 
recommending the appointment of , the company's independent 
accountants.145/
The Commission, as explained in part II of this report, 
historically has encouraged the use of independent audit committees 
and the national exchanges, under the Commission's oversight, have 
adopted various audit committee requirements.
The recommendation regarding the one-year ban on a company 
hiring the engagement partner that has been responsible for the 
audit of the company's financial statements, however, poses several 
difficult legal and policy concerns. As suggested by this 
recommendation, there are reported cases where significant frauds 
have been discovered in companies that have hired former engagement 
partners to be chief financial officers or chief accounting 
officers, or for similar positions. The implication is that audit 
engagement partners may be hesitant to challenge managements' 
positions on accounting and reporting matters if the partners 
anticipate the opportunity to be hired by management.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, however, for the 
Commission administratively to prohibit a company from hiring
142/ Id. at 43-46.
142/ AICPA Board of Directors, Meeting the Financial Reporting 
Needs of the Future: A Public Commitment From the Public
Accounting Profession. 1 (June 1993).
144/ Id. at 4.
145/ Id.
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anyone, including the individual that the company believes is the 
most qualified candidate for any position within the company.146/ 
Further, it would appear that the time for the greatest risk to 
investors is while a compliant or conspirator engagement partner 
remains with the accounting firm and in control of the audit of the 
company's financial statements. Once the partner leaves the 
engagement and joins the company, a new engagement partner, with 
a fresh view of the company, may be more willing to challenge 
corporate management. In other words, if management and the 
engagement partner have the intent to perpetuate a fraud, the 
partner may remain with the firm rather than risk turning the audit 
engagement over to another individual who may uncover the 
conspiracy. In addition, if management wants to compensate the 
engagement partner for his or her role in a fraud, a ban on hiring 
the engagement partner for a certain period of time may not 
prohibit the company from providing payments to the partner, after 
he or she resigns from the accounting firm, through consulting 
contracts or other means.
The heaviest burden of such a prohibition on hiring former 
engagement partners may fall on small corporations that are in need 
of inside accounting expertise provided by someone familiar with 
their business and industry. Due to these complex issues, it may 
be advisable for the AICPA, who has advocated such a restriction, 
to consider the adoption of an ethics rule in this area before the 
Commission takes action. The AICPA may be in a better position to 
analyze the detriments to smaller businesses and smaller accounting 
firms of such a ban on employment opportunities. The Commission 
will continue to pursue enforcement action whenever it uncovers 
fraudulent financial reporting that has been facilitated by a 
"revolving door," and the staff will monitor the AICPA's efforts 
in pursuing an ethics rule in this area.
Another argument that sometimes is advanced is that the 
Commission should adopt a rule mandating periodic rotation of 
accounting firms conducting the audits of the financial statements 
of public companies. The theory behind that argument is that the
146/ As a result of these difficulties, the implementation of such 
a restriction more likely would be in the form of a Commission 
or staff interpretation that if a corporation hires the former 
partner in charge of the engagement to audit the corporation's 
financial statements, then the partner's former firm would not 
be considered independent for a number of years from the date 
the corporation hired the former partner (or, possibly, from 
the date the partner resigned from his or her former firm). 
If the Commission or staff issued such an interpretation, the 
m a j o r  firms might attempt to amend their partnership or other 
agreements to have each individual, when he or she becomes a 
partner in the firm, agree not to accept a subsequent position 
that will impair the firm's independence.
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auditors will not have the opportunity to develop the long-term, 
close relationships that could cause an auditor's independence to 
become impaired and that auditors would be more likely to force 
clients to make more disclosures and adopt more conservative 
accounting policies or practices. The SECPS currently has 
requirements establishing a maximum term over which an individual 
partner may serve a particular audit client, in order to address 
that possibility. That term currently is seven years. There is 
no current requirement, however, for a periodic rotation of 
independent accounting firms.
Mandatory rotation of independent accounting firms has been 
examined before. The Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities' 
(known as the Cohen Commission) Report. Conclusions, and 
Recommendations. issued in 1978, expressed several concerns about 
such a policy.147/ The Cohen Commission indicated that mandatory 
rotation of firms could increase considerably the cost of audits 
as there would be frequent duplication of audit start-up costs and 
learning time to become familiar with a company. Further, the 
Cohen Commission's study of cases of substandard audits found that 
there may be a "higher peril" associated with new audit clients; 
it stated that once an auditor becomes "well acquainted with the 
operations of the client, audit risks are reduced."148/ The Cohen 
Commission also indicated that mandatory rotation of independent 
accounting firms could lead to further issues caused by "excessive 
competition” among accounting firms.149/ The conclusion reached 
by the Cohen Commission was,
Since the cost of mandatory rotation [of independent 
accounting firms] would be high and the benefits that 
financial statement users might gain would be offset by the 
loss of benefits that result from a continuing relationship, 
rotation should not be required.150/
147/ The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, Report. 
Conclusions, and Recommendations, 108-109 (AICPA 1978).
148/ Id. at 109.
149/ "Excessive competition,” as discussed by the Cohen Commission, 
could occur due to the similarity of the "products” provided 
by the firms and the difficulty of investors' evaluating 
differences in the quality of audits among the firms, among 
other things. These factors contribute to competition based 
principally on the price of the audit, which, in turn, may 
lead to limited budgets for conducting audits. The Cohen 
Commission indicated that these limited budgets may lead to 
time pressures that set the stage for faulty audit work. Id. 
at 101-118.
150/ Id. at 109.
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The Cohen Commission further indicated that a company's audit 
committee is in the best position to decide when it is appropriate 
to change auditors.151/
The Commission staff is aware of only one country, Italy, in 
which rotation of accounting firms is required. The Italian 
securities regulator, CONSOB, also has the authority to approve the 
selection of a company's auditors and to establish the audit fee. 
That additional authority might mitigate the fear that further 
increased competition for audits, which often are won by cutting 
fees, would cause a reduction in audit procedures and audit 
quality. In addition to the Italian situation, the staff is aware 
that, prior to 1992, Tier I Canadian banks' financial statements 
were required to rotate accounting firms every two years under the 
Canadian Bank Act. The Bank Act was amended in 1992 to delete that 
requirement along with the requirement that Tier I Canadian banks' 
financial statements be audited jointly by teams of two auditors.
The OCA currently is of the view that the SECPS requirement 
for a periodic change in the engagement partner in charge of the 
audit, especially when coupled with the SECPS requirement for 
second partner reviews. 152/ provides a sufficient opportunity for 
bringing a fresh viewpoint to the audit without creating the 
significant costs and risks associated with changing accounting 
firms that were identified by the Cohen Commission. The OCA 
recognizes that a well-informed, independent audit committee may 
be in the best position to decide when the benefits of a change in 
auditors outweighs the costs. Several hundred companies make this 
determination each year and change auditors. 153/ Accordingly, the 
staff does not, at this time, recommend legislation or rulemaking 
to mandate rotation of independent accounting firms.
151/ Id.
152/ A "concurring partner" or "second partner" review is a review 
of the audit workpapers and related information by a partner 
(or other SECPS approved reviewer) other than the partner in 
charge of the audit. Among other things, the second partner 
objectively should review accounting, auditing, and financial 
reporting issues from the perspective of someone who has not 
dealt with the client on an ongoing basis and is less 
susceptible to pressure from the client. For many firms, the 
second partner's approval is a prerequisite to the issuance 
of the audit report.
153/ For a discussion of the disclosures required upon a change in 
independent accounting firms, see Auditor Resignation or 
Dismissal in part II of this report.
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VIZ. CONCLUSION
The OCA believes that the combination of the extensive systems 
of independence requirements issued by the Commission and the 
AICPA, coupled with the Commission's active enforcement program, 
provide to investors reasonable safeguards against loss due to the 
conduct of audits by accountants that lack independence from their 
audit clients. The enactment of detailed legislation or the 
promulgation of additional rules is not necessary.
The OCA believes that further legislation or fundamental 
changes in the Commission's regulations are not necessary at this 
time for the protection of investors.
-END-
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE
W ashington, D C 20515-6119 
March 18, 1993
DAVID H. MOULTON  
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR
The Honorable Richard C. Breeden
Chairman
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20549
Dear Chairman Breeden:
On February 18, 1993, you testified before the Subcommittee 
on Telecommunications and Finance in support of H.R. 574, the 
"Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act.” In that 
testimony, you referred to an ongoing case, SEC v. Ernst &  Young, 
in which the Commission is seeking a permanent injunction against 
Ernst & Young (as successor to Arthur Young & Co.) for certain 
securities violations resulting from Arthur Young's lack of 
independence as outside accountant for RepublicBank Corporation. 
This morning, the Subcommittee reported H.R. 574 to the full 
Energy and Commerce Committee. This bill represents an important 
step in making the auditing industry more truly accountable to the 
investing public. It is important that this new level of 
statutory accountability not be undercut by a lack of real-world 
independence.
I understand that the Commission's existing rules regarding 
independence address a situation like that which arose in the 
Arthur Young context, where more than fifty Arthur Young partners 
were members of real estate partnerships that borrowed over $15.8 
million from the audit client, RepublicBank, and where at least 
twenty-seven Arthur Young partners received more than $5 million 
in personal loans from that institution. However, this case and 
others highlight the importance of protecting the independence of 
auditors from their auditing clients. Despite changes that appear 
to have occurred in both the auditing industry and in the 
preparation and use of audited financial statements, the 
Commission has not formally reviewed its independence rules for 
some time. Accordingly I request that the Commission prepare a 
study of the need for, and any impediments to, the independence of 
public accountants in the preparation and certification of 
financial statements for purposes of the Federal securities laws.
The Honorable Richard C. Breeden 
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March 18, 1993
The Commission should provide the members of the Subcommittee 
with this study, accompanied by any recommendations for 
legislation the Commission considers appropriate or any 
conclusions as to rule changes that may be required for the 
protection of investors or the public interest, as soon as 
possible, but not later than one year from this date. If the 
members of the Commission or the Commission staff have any 
questions about this request, they should contact Elise Hoffmann 
of the Subcommittee staff at (202) 226-2424. Thank you for your 
attention to this matter.
Sincerely
Edward J. Markey 
Chairman
cc: The Honorable Jack Fields, Ranking Republican Member 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance 
Members, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance
The Honorable John D. Dingell, Chairman 
Committee on Energy and Commerce
The Honorable Carlos J. Moorhead, Ranking Republican Member 
Committee on Energy and Commerce
Appendix II
Comparison of Commission, AICPA, and International Independence 
Requirements
The Commission staff responds to numerous oral and written 
requests for informal advice on the application of the Commission's 
independence requirements. In responding to those requests, the 
Commission staff evaluates the specific facts and circumstances of 
each situation and renders its views based on the independence 
requirements of both the Commission and the AICPA. Thus, auditors 
to U.S. public companies must comply with two sets of independence 
requirements--AICPA requirements and Commission requirements. 
Likewise, auditors to transnational issuers seeking to list 
securities on a U.S. exchange or offer securities to U.S. investors 
generally would be required to comply with both U.S. and home 
country independence requirements. The significant independence 
requirements are discussed below in detail including a discussion 
of the significant differences between the Commission's 
requirements and the AICPA's requirements, the requirements 
contained in the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 
promulgated by the International Federation of Accountants ("IFAC 
Code"), 1/ and requirements prevalent in other parts of the world. 2/
1 /  The IFAC Code was developed by IFAC's Ethics Committee and 
was proposed for public comment on June 1, 1989. It provides 
guidance for member countries to consider in setting their own 
local independence requirements. The IFAC Code was issued in 
July 1990 and revised in July 1992.
2/ The examples of other countries' standards have been drawn 
from the Commission staff's review of selected portions of 
those countries' laws and professional literature. This 
presentation is of necessity incomplete and may not reflect 
fully all technical interpretations or their application in 
practice.
2A. Applicability of Standards to Accounting Firm Personnel
The principal difference between the SEC and AICPA 
requirements is the applicability of the Commission's requirements 
to all firm employees that provide any professional services to the 
client, not limited solely to those employees working on an 
engagement requiring independence.
Australia, France, 3/ Italy, and the Netherlands have adopted 
rules that can be read to apply to all employees of the firm. The 
IFAC Code and Germany's requirements extend to all partners and 
certified professional personnel, as well as all other employees 
participating on the engagement. Canada's requirements 4/ 
generally are applicable only to partners, while key Japanese 5/ 
and British requirements generally are applicable only to personnel 
participating in the audit.
B. Financial Interests
1. Direct and Indirect Interests
The AICPA's requirements state that a member's independence 
will be considered to be impaired if during the period of a
3/ Examples of French requirements cited are those applicable to 
the Order des Experts Comptables et des Comptables Agrees 
which represents qualified practicing accountants. Additional 
requirements apply to statutory auditors in certain 
circumstances.
4/ Independence requirements in Canada are established by the 
provincial institutes of chartered accountants. The 
requirements of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Ontario are being used here as representative of Canadian 
requirements.
5/ Examples of Japanese regulations cited are those applicable 
to the independence of audit corporations auditing 
consolidated financial statements.
3professional engagement or at the time of expressing an opinion, 
a member or a member's firm had or was committed to acquire a 
direct or material indirect financial interest in the [client]. 
(AICPA Ethics Interpretation (Interp.) No. 101-1)
A  direct or indirect financial interest held by a spouse or 
dependent person is ascribed to the member (Interp. 101-9)
The Commission's requirements are similar to the AICPA's 
except that a direct financial interest includes one held by 
persons other than the accountant's spouse who are resident in the 
member's household, and any person subject to the accountant's 
supervision or control. Materiality is determined primarily by 
reference to the net worth of the accountant, his or her firm, and 
the client. No specific level is specified as being material. 
(Codification of Financial Reporting Policies (FRP) Section 
602.02.b.i)
The IFAC Code, and requirements in Canada and Germany, are 
essentially the same as the AICPA. Australia, France, the 
Netherlands, and Japan have adopted rules that prohibit material 
financial interests in clients, but permit direct or indirect 
immaterial financial interests. Italy's rules prohibit any 
financial interests, while Britain prohibits direct financial 
interests.
2. Relationships with Trusts Holding Financial Interests
The AICPA's requirements state that a member's independence 
will be considered to be impaired if during the period of a 
professional engagement or at the time of expressing an opinion, 
a member or a member's firm was a trustee of any trust or executor 
o f  any estate if such trust or estate had or was committed to 
acquire any direct or material indirect financial interest in the 
[client]. (Interp. 101-1)
4The Commission's requirements also prohibit such relationships 
with minor exceptions for foreign auditors. (FRP 602.02.g, examples 
18 and 19)
The IFAC Code prohibits auditors from serving as trustees of 
trusts holding interests material to the audit client or to the 
holdings of the estate or trust. The Australian, Canadian, and 
British standards are similar to the IFAC Code. Italy prohibits 
holding a controlling financial interest in a client, while the 
Netherlands and Germany prohibit any such relationship. Rules in 
France and Japan do not address the subject.
3. Joint, Closely Held Investments
The AICPA's requirements state that a member's independence 
will be considered to be impaired if during the period of a 
professional engagement or at the time of expressing an opinion, 
a member or a member's firm had a joint, closely held investment 
with the [client] or with any officer, director, or principal 
stockholder thereof that was material in relation to the net worth 
of the member or the member's firm. (Interp. 101-1)
The Commission would consider such a relationship to 
constitute a direct business relationship with a client or persons 
associated with the client. Such a relationship impairs 
independence, irrespective of materiality. (FRP 602.02.g)
The rules in Canada, France, Italy, and Japan are silent on 
this issue. The Netherlands has rules that are similar to the 
AICPA's, while Australia prohibits "mutual business interests" with 
clients and their officers and employees. The IFAC Code, Germany, 
and Britain urge caution, noting that such relationships may impair 
independence.
54. L o a n s
The AICPA's requirements state that a member's independence 
will be considered to be impaired if during the period of a 
professional engagement or at the time of expressing an opinion, 
a member or a member's firm had any loan6/ to or from the [client] 
or any officer, director, or principal stockholder of the [client]. 
The following loans from a financial institution7/ when made under 
normal lending procedures, terms, and requirements8/ are not
6/ A loan includes a guarantee of a loan, a letter of credit, and 
a line of credit. A loan to a limited partnership in which 
members have a combined investment exceeding 50% of the total 
limited partnership interests is considered a loan to these 
members.
7/ A financial institution is considered to be an entity that, 
as part of its normal business operations, makes loans to the 
general public.
8/ Normal lending procedures, terms, and requirements relating 
to a member's loan from a financial institution are defined 
as those that are reasonably comparable with those relating 
to loans of a similar character committed to other borrowers 
during the period in which the loan to the member is 
committed. In making such comparison and in evaluating 
whether a loan was made under "normal lending procedures, 
terms, and requirements," the member should consider all the 
circumstances under which the loan was granted, including:
a. The amount of the loan in relation to the 
value of the collateral pledged as security 
and the credit standing of the member or the 
member's firm.
b . Repayment terms.
c. Interest rate, including points.
d. Closing costs.
e. General availability of such loans to the 
public. (Interp. 101-5)
(continued__)
6considered to impair independence. Such loans, however, must be 
kept current at all times as to all terms.
a. Automobile loans and leases collateralized by 
automobiles.
b. Loans of the cash surrender value under terms of a life 
insurance policy.
c. Borrowings fully collateralized by cash deposits at the 
same financial institution.
d. Credit cards and cash advances on checking accounts with 
an aggregate balance not paid currently of $5,000 or 
less.
The following types of loans obtained from a financial 
institution under that institution's normal lending procedures, 
terms, and requirements, and (i) that existed as of January 1, 
1992, (ii) that were obtained from a financial institution prior 
to its becoming a client requiring independence, (iii) that were 
obtained from a financial institution for which independence was 
not required and that were later sold to a client for which 
independence is required, or (iv) that were obtained from a firm's 
financial institution client requiring independence, by a borrower 
prior to his or her becoming a member with respect to such client 
also would not be considered to inpair independence. Such loans 
must, at all times, be current as to all terms and such terms shall
8 /(... continued)
This definition applies in the cases of both loans that 
currently may be made and to the loans that were 
"grandfathered" as of January 1, 1992, which are discussed 
below.
7not be renegotiated after the latest of the dates in (i) through 
(iv) above.
e. Home mortgages.
f. Other secured loans. The collateral on such loans must 
equal or exceed the remaining balance of the loan at 
January 1, 1992 and at all times thereafter.
g. Loans not material to the member's net worth.
Furthermore, an auditor may borrow from the non-client parent of 
an audit client, provided that the audit client is not material to 
the lender. (AICPA Ethics Ruling No. 98)
The Commission has not adopted requirements in addition to 
those of the AICPA in this area.
The IFAC Code is similar to the AICPA's requirements. 
Australia, Canada, and Britain have adopted rules similar to the 
IFAC Code. France and Italy prohibit any loans while Japan and the 
Netherlands prohibit material loans.
5. Interests in Non-Clients
The AICPA's requirements state that a member's independence 
may be affected if he or she has a financial interest in a non­
client that has an investor9/ or investee10/ relationship with the
9/ The term "investor" means a parent, a general partner, or a 
natural person or corporation that has the ability to exercise 
significant influence, as defined in Accounting Principles 
Board Opinion No. 18. "The Equity Method of Accounting for 
Investments in Common Stock," through the financial interest.
8client.11/ Where a brother-sister common control situation exists 
between a client and a non-client, an immaterial investment in the 
non-client generally would not impair independence. In a joint 
venture situation, an immaterial financial interest in the non­
client investor generally would not impair independence with 
respect to the client investee, provided that the member could not 
significantly influence the non-client investor. (Interp. 101-8)
The Commission requires an accountant to be independent of an 
audit client and all of its parents, subsidiaries, and 
affiliates.12/ (S-X, 2-01(b))
Interpretations by the Commission's staff prohibit investments 
by a member (as defined in Rule 2-01(b) of Regulation S-X (S-X)) 
in a non-audit client if the member has knowledge of an investment 
or intention to invest by an audit client, or a person identified 
with an audit client, in the same or an affiliated entity. If such 
an investment is made without knowledge of similar action by a 
client or person identified with the client (and the investment is 
not a jointly, closely held investment), upon learning of the 
client's involvement, the investment may be retained by the member
10/(...continued)
10/ An investee is defined as a subsidiary or an entity subject 
to the significant influence of the investor.
11/ For example: where a non-client investee is material to a 
client investor, any direct or material indirect financial 
interest in the non-client by a member would im pair 
independence; and where a client investee is material to a 
non-client investor, any direct or material indirect interest 
in the non-client by a member would impair independence.
12/ An affiliate is defined as a person (an individual, 
corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, 
business trust, or unincorporated organization (S-X, 1- 
02 (p))) that directly, or indirectly through one or more 
intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under 
common control with, the person specified. (S-X, 1-02(b))
9provided that the investment is immaterial to the member. If the 
investment represents 5% or more of the member's net worth, it must 
be sold to an unrelated party to avoid an independence problem.
The IFAC Code and British requirements do not address this 
issue. Australia, Canada, and Italy generally proscribe such 
holdings. France, Japan, and the Netherlands prohibit material 
financial interests in investors or investees of an audit client. 
Germany proscribes the ownership of shares in any company owning 
more than 20% of an audit client.
C. Appointments in Clients
1. Persons Currently Associated with the Accountant
The AICPA's requirements state that a member's independence 
will be considered to be impaired if during the period covered by 
the financial statements, during the period of a professional 
engagement, or at the time of expressing an opinion, a member or 
a member's firm was connected with the [client] as a promoter, 
underwriter, or voting trustee, as a director or officer, or in any 
capacity equivalent to that of a member of management or of an 
employee or was a trustee for any pension or profit-sharing trust 
of the [client]. (Interp. 101-1)
A member's firm will not include an employee (as opposed to 
a proprietor, partner, or shareholder) solely because he or she was 
formerly associated with the client in any of those capacities, if 
that employee has disassociated himself or herself from the client 
and does not participate in the engagement for the client covering 
any period of his or her association with the client. Similarly, 
the term "member's firm" shall include all individuals who provide 
services to clients and are located in an office participating in 
a significant portion of the engagement, for purposes of applying 
this rule. (Interp. 101-9)
10
A member may serve as the honorary director or trustee of a 
not-for-profit client of a charitable, religious, civic, or similar 
nature so long as he or she holds a purely honorary position and 
is identified as holding such in all letterheads and externally 
circulated materials in which he or she is named as a director or 
trustee, restricts participation to the use of his or her name, and 
cannot vote or otherwise participate in management functions. 
(Interp. 101-4)
The Commission's requirements are substantially the same; 
however, the exception regarding persons formerly associated with 
a client differs somewhat. The Commission applies that exception 
to a person formerly associated as an officer or employee who is 
employed by or becomes a partner, shareholder, or other principal 
in the firm when such individual has completely disassociated 
himself or herself from the client and its affiliates and does not 
participate in the audit of the financial statements covering any 
period of his or her employment by the client. (S-X, 2-01 (b))
The IFAC Code and all of national rules studied by the 
Commission staff contain restrictions similar to those included in 
the AICPA requirements.
2. former partners
The AICPA rules state that a former practitioner who is 
connected with the [client] as a promoter, underwriter, or voting 
trustee, as a director or officer, or in any capacity equivalent 
to that of a member of management or of an employee or as a trustee 
for any pension or profit-sharing trust of the client, also would 
impair the firm's independence with respect to the client with 
which the former partner is associated unless certain provisions 
are met. Those provisions are (i) the payment of the amounts due 
to the former practitioner for his or her interest in the firm and
11
for unfunded, vested retirement benefits according to the payment 
schedule in effect should be such that the payments do not cause 
a substantial doubt about the firm's ability to continue as a going 
concern for a reasonable period of time, (ii) such payments must 
be fixed as to amount and payment dates and may be adjusted only 
for inflation, (iii) the former practitioner does not participate 
in the firm's business or professional activities, whether or not 
compensated for such participation, and (iv) the former 
practitioner does not appear to participate in the activities of, 
or be associated with, his or her former firm; however, a former 
partner may be provided an office and related amenities without 
violating this requirement unless he or she is in a position of 
significant influence with the audit client. (Interp. 101-2)
The Commission's rules also require that the former partner's 
capital balances be paid in full prior to commencement of an 
engagement by the auditor or acceptance of the position of director 
by the former partner, whichever is relevant. An independence 
problem also may exist when the former partner was closely 
associated with the provision of services to a client within a 
short period of time (two years) prior to accepting a position 
with, or substantial ownership interest in, the client. (FRP 
602.02.f)
If a former partner proposes to accept a responsible position 
(officer) with a client of his or her former firm, the former 
partner must terminate all relationships with the former firm, 
including the full payment of any retirement benefits payable to 
him or her.
The IFAC Code does not address the issue of former partners. 
Canada's rules are similar to those of the AICPA. The rules in 
France, Japan, Britain, and Germany do not place any restrictions 
on such appointments. The rules in the Netherlands state that the 
firm and the retired partner must determine whether such an
12
appointment would impair the independence of the firm. In 
Australia, all independence requirements apply to retired partners, 
referred to as principals in Australia, who are required to render 
services to their former firm when asked to do so. In Italy, a 
three-year period must expire before a former partner may take a 
position with an audit client.
D. Other Professional Services
1. Bookkeeping
Under the AICPA's requirements, a member performing accounting 
services for an audit client must meet the following requirements 
to retain the appearance of independence in the eyes of a 
reasonable observer.
a. The client must accept the responsibility for the 
financial statements as his or her own. The client must 
be sufficiently informed of the enterprise's activities 
and financial condition and the applicable accounting 
principles so that he or she can reasonably accept such 
responsibility, including specifically, fairness of 
valuation and presentation and adequacy of disclosure. 
When necessary, the accountant must discuss accounting 
matters with the client to assist the client in 
understanding such matters.
 
b. The accountant must not assume the role of an employee 
or of management conducting the operations of the 
client's business.13/
13/ For example, the accountant shall not consummate transactions, 
h a v e  custody of assets, or exercise authority on behalf of the 
client. The client must prepare the source documents on all 
transactions in sufficient detail to identify clearly the
(continued...)
13
c. The accountant must comply with generally accepted 
auditing standards including an examination of financial 
statements prepared from books and records that he or she 
has maintained completely or in part. (Interp. 101-3)
The Commission's position is that the accountant cannot be 
deemed independent with regard to auditing financial statements of 
a client if the accountant has participated closely, either 
manually or through its computer services, in maintenance of the 
basic accounting records and preparation of financial statements, 
or if the accountant performs other accounting services through 
which he or she participates with management in operational 
decisions. Where source data are prepared by the client and the 
accountant's work is limited to processing and production of 
listings and reports, independence will be affected adversely if 
the listings and reports become part of the basic accounting 
records on which, at least in part, the accountant would base his 
or her opinion. (FRP 602.02.c)
The IFAC Code is generally consistent with the AICPA rules, 
with the further proviso that personnel who provide bookkeeping 
services normally should not participate in the audit. Rules in 
the Netherlands are similar to the IFAC Code. Japan and Germany 
appear to prohibit bookkeeping services for audit clients. Canada 
and France permit bookkeeping services without regard to which 
personnel perform such services, although France proscribes such
13/(...continued)
nature and amount of such transactions and maintain an 
accounting control over data processed by the accountant such 
as control totals and document counts. The accountant should 
not make changes in such basic data without the concurrence 
of the client.
14
services by statutory auditors. 14/ Australia and Britain prohibit 
bookkeeping for public companies, but permit it for private 
companies with provisions similar to those of the AICPA. Italy's 
rules do not include bookkeeping services among the allowed 
services that may be performed by auditors.
2 . Other Serv ice s
The AICPA states that an accountant performing advisory 
services relating to the implementation of an information and 
control system must take reasonable precautions to restrict his or 
her supervisory activities to initial instruction and training of 
personnel. The client must make all significant management 
decisions relating to the implementation of the project. (Ethics 
Ruling No. 55.)
Performance by a member of appraisal, valuation, or actuarial 
services, the results of which may be incorporated to the client's 
financial statements, would not impair a member's independence if 
all of the significant matters of judgment involved are determined 
or approved by the client and the client is in a position to have 
an informed judgment on the results of those services. (Ethics 
Ruling No. 54.)
The SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms 
prohibits member firms from providing executive recruitment and 
certain actuarial services to the member firms' public audit 
clients.
The Commission, in Accounting Series Release 264, identified 
several criteria that should be considered in determining whether
14/ Statutory auditors are required for certain entities under 
the laws of a number of countries. The duties of statutory 
auditors are prescribed by law and frequently extend beyond 
an examination of the financial statements.
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the performance of specific non-audit services would impair an 
auditor's independence, either in appearance or in fact. Included 
among those factors are:
a. The dependence of the auditor on management advisory 
service ("MAS”) fees (for example, the relationship 
between total MAS revenues and total firm revenues and 
between MAS revenues from an individual client to the 
client's audit fee),
b. Avoidance of supplanting the role of management as the 
result of an MAS engagement, and
c. Avoidance of self-review by the auditor, including the 
effect on objectivity of auditing the product of systems 
designed by the auditor.
The Commission's staff has raised questions regarding the 
independence of accountants who have provided certain types of 
management advisory services to audit clients. Those services 
include:
d. Preparation of prospective financial information and 
feasibility studies,
e. Issuance of fairness opinions and valuation reports, and
f . Mergers and acquisitions related services where the 
accountant participated in negotiations or decision­
making on behalf of, or with, the client.
The IFAC Code does not cover these services specifically, nor 
do the rules of any country studied by the Commission staff. 
However, the IFAC Code and the rules in Australia, Britain, and 
Germany state that the auditor should not perform executive
16
functions while rendering non-audit services to audit clients, and 
in the Netherlands auditors are cautioned to assure that 
independence is not impaired by non-audit services. The staff is 
aware that services involving the issuance of fairness opinions and 
valuation reports, including to audit clients, routinely are 
performed by auditors in some countries.
e . Litigation
The AICPA states that actual or threatened litigation may 
affect independence, since the relationship between an auditor and 
client should be one of complete candor and full disclosure 
regarding all aspects of the client's business operations.
Litigation between a member and a client may impair 
independence. When the present management of the client commences, 
or expresses an intention to commence, legal action against the 
auditor, the auditor and client may be placed in adversary 
positions in which management's willingness to make complete 
disclosures and the auditor's objectivity may be affected by self- 
interest. 15/
15/ For example:
a. the commencement of litigation by management 
alleging deficiencies in audit work would impair 
independence;
b. the commencement of litigation by the member 
alleging management fraud or deceit would impair 
independence;
c. an expressed intention by management to commence 
litigation alleging deficiencies in audit work would 
impair independence if the member concludes that 
there is a strong possibility that such a suit 
actually will be filed;
d. litigation not related to audit work for the client 
for an amount not material to the member's firm
(continued...)
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Litigation against a member and the client, or its management, 
would not have necessarily an adverse im pact on independence. 
These situations must be examined carefully, however, since the 
potential for adverse interests may exist if cross-claims are filed 
against the member, or if the member alleges fraud or deceit by 
present management as a defense.
Litigation by other third parties against a member generally 
does not inpair independence unless the member alleges fraud or 
deceit by management as a defense. (Interp. 101-6)
The Commission's requirements are generally consistent with 
the AICPA's, except (i) even the likelihood of litigation between 
the client and accountant may have an inpact on independence if the 
accountant concludes that there is a strong probability that a suit 
will be brought, since in those circumstances both parties may be 
taking actions that are primarily designed to protect their legal 
positions, which would prejudice effective communication between 
them, and (ii) independence also may be impaired in situations 
where management and the accountant are bound so closely together 
in their defenses of a suit brought by a third party that they have 
a commonality of legal interest. (FRP 602.02.i.ii)
15/(...continued)
generally would not inpair independence; and
e. litigation by security holders against a member and 
the client or its management may impair independence 
although the litigation itself may not alter the 
fundamental relationship between the member and the 
client's management (e.g., independence may be 
impaired if cross claims are filed against the 
member alleging that he or she is responsible for 
any deficiencies in the financial statements, and 
independence may be impaired if the auditor alleges 
fraud or deceit by management as a defense).
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The IFAC Code contains advisory language similar to that in 
the AICPA's requirements. None of the countries studied by the 
staff addressed this issue.
F. Family Relationships
The AICPA states that a member's independence may be impaired 
by a family relationship with a person connected with the audit 
client. Relationships proscribed for the member also are 
proscribed for his or her spouse and any dependent persons, except 
that independence normally will not be impaired solely because of 
the employment of a spouse or dependent person in a position that 
does not allow significant influence. However, if the member's 
spouse or dependent relative is in an audit sensitive position16/, 
the individual member should not participate in the engagement.
The independence of a member and his or her firm also would 
be impaired as the result of a family relationship when the member 
participates in the engagement and a non-dependent, close 
relative17/ of the member (i) can exercise significant influence 
over the client, (ii) is employed in an audit sensitive position, 
or (iii) has a material financial interest, which is known by the 
member, in the client.
16/ A person's activities would be considered audit sensitive if 
such activities are normally an element of, or subject to, 
significant internal accounting controls such as cashier, 
internal auditor, accounting supervisor, purchasing agent, or 
inventory warehouse supervisor.
17/ A close relative is defined as including non-dependent 
children, grandchildren, stepchildren, brothers, sisters, 
grandparents, parents, parents-in-law, and their respective 
spouses. Close relatives do not include the brothers and 
sisters of the member's spouse.
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The independence of a member and his or her firm also would 
be impaired as the result of a family relationship when the member 
is located in an office participating in a significant portion of 
the engagement and a non-dependent, close relative can exercise 
significant influence over the client. (Interp. 101-9)
The Commission's requirements state that a presumption of 
impairment is related directly to the closeness of the family bond. 
Attention also is directed to other factors such as the positions 
occupied by the parties in their respective employment. Minor 
differences between the SEC's and the AICPA's requirements exist 
in the definition of "close relative.” The impairment of 
independence may be mitigated where there is adequate geographic 
separation of the individual accountant from the family member and 
from the engagement to preclude the possibility of contacts and 
influence that could give rise to a conclusion that the 
accountant's and his or her firm's independence appeared to be 
impaired. (FRP 602.02.h)
The IFAC Code states that each member body should decide, in 
light of social conditions existing in its own country, what degree 
of relationship with a client should be regarded as too close, and, 
therefore, should be proscribed to ensure that an objective 
approach to professional work for that client will not suffer. 
Family relationships that always pose an unacceptable threat to 
independence are those in which a sole practitioner or a partner 
in a practice, or an employee assigned to the engagement relating 
to the client, is the spouse, dependent child, or relative living 
in a common household with the client's principal owners, executive 
directors, or financial officers.
Italy's rules proscribe family relationships between a 
partner, director, statutory auditor, or general manager of an 
audit firm and their counterparts in a client organization. 
Canada's independence requirements proscribe only members of a
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partner's household from serving as officers or directors of audit 
clients. Japan's requirements proscribe the audit engagement 
partner's immediate relatives from working for the client as 
officers, officer-equivalents, or other positions related to the 
client's financial affairs. Rules in Australia, France, the 
Netherlands, Germany, and Britain note that independence may be 
impaired by family relationships, but do not address specific 
family relationships.
g . Fees
1. Magnitude or Concentration
The AICPA does not address this issue.
The Commission's published requirements do not specifically 
address this issue; however, the Commission's staff raises 
questions regarding the independence of accountants who derive more 
than 15% of their total revenues from one client or group of 
related clients, based on the belief that a concentration of fees 
in excess of that limit causes the accountant to be overly 
dependent on the client or group of related clients. 
Determinations are based on the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case.
British rules cite a 15% threshold as raising questions about 
independence. The Netherlands states that an auditor should not 
report on the financial statements of a client on which the auditor 
is consistently and to a material extent dependent for income. The 
IFAC Code, Australia, France, and Germany caution against deriving 
a substantial portion of a firm's fees from one client or a related 
group. Canada, Italy, and Japan do not address the subject, 
although in Italy fees are set in accordance with guidelines 
established by securities regulators and there is a maximum term 
for which an auditor may serve a particular client.
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2. Unpaid Prior Professional Fees
The AICPA states that the independence of a member's firm may 
be impaired if, when the report on the client's financial 
statements for the current year is issued, fees remain unpaid, 
whether billed or unbilled, for professional services provided more 
than one year prior to the date of the report. Such unpaid amounts 
assume the characteristics of a loan. (Ethics Ruling No. 52)
The Commission's requirements have not been updated to reflect 
the AICPA's requirements, which were revised in November 1990. The 
Commission's requirements state that unpaid fees that are material 
with respect to the current year audit fee must be paid prior to 
the commencement of the current audit. When an unpaid fee problem 
exists in connection with the audit of financial statements to be 
included in an annual report as opposed to a registration 
statement, these guidelines sometimes are modified. The client 
either may arrange to pay the past due fees prior to the issuance 
of the audit report or agree to an arrangement to make periodic 
payments to settle the delinquent fees. In the latter case, the 
auditor must conclude that there is reasonable assurance that all 
fees will be paid prior to the commencement of the audit for the 
ensuing year. (FRP 602.02.b.v) The Commission's staff generally 
would apply the more restrictive AICPA requirements.
The IFAC Code states that fees unpaid for an extended period 
may impair independence. France states that fees should be 
collected in accordance with the auditor's normal billing terms. 
Other countries do not address this issue.
3. Commissions and Contingent Fees
Under the AICPA's Rules of the Code of Professional Conduct, 
commissions received for the referral of products or services of
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others to a client, payments to obtain a client (referral fees), 
and contingent fees received under an arrangement whereby no fee 
will be charged unless a specified finding or result is obtained 
or where the amount of the fee is otherwise contingent upon the 
finding or results of such services, are prohibited by the AICPA 
if a member or his or her firm provides attest services to the 
client. The receipt of such fees is prohibited during the period 
of the attest services engagement and during the period covered by 
any historical financial statements involved in such attest 
services. (Ethics Rules 302 and 503)
Fees are not considered to be contingent if fixed by courts 
or, in tax matters, if determined based on the results of judicial 
proceedings or the findings of governmental agencies.
The Commission has not adopted requirements in addition to 
those of the AICPA in this area.
The IFAC Code is similar to the AICPA's requirements. 
Contingent fee arrangements are permitted in certain circumstances 
in Britain with disclosure.
H. Goods and Services from Client
The AICPA's requirements state that the acceptance by an 
employee or partner of more than a token gift from a client, even 
with the knowledge of the member's firm, may cause the appearance 
of independence to be lacking. (Ethics Ruling No. 1)
The Commission has not adopted requirements in addition to 
those of the AICPA in this area.
The IFAC Code notes that hospitality and gifts on a scale 
beyond that which is commensurate with the normal courtesies of 
social life should not be accepted. Rules of Australia, France,
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Japan, and the Netherlands generally are consistent with the 
AICPA's rule. Britain permits auditors to acquire goods and 
services on terms no more favorable than those available to all of 
a client's employees. The subject is not addressed specifically 
by Canada, Italy, and Germany.
I .  B u s in e s s  Relationships with Clients
In addition to the AICPA's requirements regarding financial 
interests discussed in section B., the AICPA's requirements state 
that independence will be considered impaired if, during the period 
of a professional engagement or at the time of expressing an 
opinion, a member had any cooperative arrangement18/ with the 
client that was material to the member's firm or to the client. 
(Interp. 101-12) A  member leasing property to an audit client 
creates an indirect financial interest in the client that impairs 
independence if that indirect financial interest is material to 
that member. (Ethics Ruling No. 58) However, a member leasing 
property from an audit client does not impair independence if, at 
the time the lease is entered into, it meets the criteria of an 
operating lease and is made under normal leasing procedures, terms, 
and requirements. (Ethics Ruling No. 91) In addition, a member's 
limited partnership interest in a limited partnership in which a 
client is the general partner would impair that member's 
independence with respect to that client if the respective
18/ A cooperative arrangement exists when a member's firm and a 
client jointly participate in a business activity. Examples 
cited are prime/subcontractor arrangements to provide services 
or products to a third party; joint ventures to develop or 
market products or services, arrangements to combine one or 
more services or products of the firm with one or more 
services or products of the client and market the package with 
references to both parties, and distribution or marketing 
arrangements under which the firm acts as the distributor or 
marketer of the client's products or services or the client 
acts as the distributor or marketer of the products or 
services of the firm.
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investments in the limited partnership are material to either the 
client or the member. (Ethics Ruling No. 81) A member's joint 
interest in a vacation home along with an officer, director, or 
principal stockholder of an audit client would impair the member's 
independence with respect to that client if the investment is 
material to either the officer, director, or principal stockholder 
or the member. (Ethics Ruling No. 92)
The Commission's requirements state that direct and material 
indirect business relationships, other than as a consumer in the 
normal course of business, with a client or with persons associated 
with the client in a decision-making capacity, such as officers, 
directors, or substantial stockholders, will adversely affect the 
accountant's independence with respect to that client. In addition 
to the relationships discussed previously in sections C and D, 
joint business ventures, limited partnership agreements, 
investments in supplier or customer companies, leasing interests 
(other than immaterial landlord-tenant relationships), and sales 
by the accountant of items other than professional services are 
examples of other prohibited relationships.
The Commission's rules also state that an accountant cannot 
maintain margin or discretionary accounts with a broker-dealer 
audit client, and must take delivery on a timely basis of any cash 
or securities resulting from transactions executed through a 
regular cash account with such a client. (FRP 802.02.g)
The IFAC Code does not specifically address this issue. The 
rules of Australia, Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Germany variously proscribe, limit, or express concern about 
business relationships with clients and the clients' personnel. 
Specifically mentioned among the countries are joint business 
v e n t u r e s ,  m u t u a l  business interests, and contractual relationships. 
Canada and Japan make no specific references to the subject.
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J. Incompatible Occupations
The AICPA considers independence impaired if legal services 
rendered to an audit client result in undue identification with 
management. (Ethics Ruling No. 51)
The Commission's requirements state that certain concurrent 
occupations of accountants engaged in the practice of public 
accounting involve relationships with clients that may jeopardize 
the accountant's objectivity and, therefore, his or her 
independence. In general, this situation arises because the 
relationships and activities customarily associated with the 
occupation are not compatible with an auditor's appearance of 
complete objectivity or have primary objectives that are 
fundamentally different from those of a public accountant. For 
example, the following concurrent occupations are generally 
prohibited:
a. Acting as counsel, since a legal counsel enters into a 
personal relationship with a client and is primarily 
concerned with the personal rights and interests of the 
client,
b. Acting as a broker/dealer, since customary activities 
could involve securities transactions of clients either 
as issuer or investor, and provide third parties with 
sufficient reason to question the accountant's ability 
to be impartial and objective, or
c. Actively engaging in direct competition in a commercial 
enterprise, since that would appear to third parties to 
be a conflict of interests that might influence the 
a c c o u n t a n t ' s  objectivity because he or she would have 
access to the records, policies and practices of a 
business competitor. (FRP 602.02.e)
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The IFAC Code and almost all of the country standards studied 
by the Commission staff contained some notion of incompatible 
occupations. However, some did not mention specific occupations, 
and the occupations specifically identified by others varied 
widely. For example, Japan prohibits virtually all concurrent 
occupations other than those directly related to the practice of 
public accounting. Germany, which also excludes most occupations, 
specifically permits the practice of law (although not for any 
audit client), engineering, science, teaching, and rendering 
financial advice.
K. Indemnification by a Client
The AICPA rules state that the inclusion in engagements 
letters of a clause that provides that the client would release, 
indemnify, defend, and hold the member (and his or her partners, 
heirs, executors, personal representatives, successors, and 
assigns) harmless from any liability and costs resulting from 
knowing misrepresentations by management would not impair the 
auditor's independence. (Ethics Ruling No. 94)
The Commission's requirements state that an accountant cannot 
be indemnified against liability for his or her own negligent acts, 
whether of omission or commission, since one of the major stimuli 
to objective or unbiased consideration of the problems encountered 
in a particular engagement is removed or greatly weakened. (FRP 
602.02.i)
Neither the IFAC nor the requirements of any country studied 
by the staff address this issue.
End
